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Abstract 
Retailers  are  becoming  the  dominant  player  in  the  food  chain  in  the  U.S.  and  other 
countries. Retailer market power is a topical issue in light of rising concentration and 
consolidation in the grocery retail sector, emerging trade practices between retailers and 
upstream  suppliers,  and  a  growing  body  of  conceptual  bases  and  empirical  evidence 
regarding retailer market power. Most likely, the key question is not whether retailers 
have  the  ability  to  influence  price,  but,  rather,  the  extent  and  implications  of  that 
influence. Understanding retailer pricing behavior is critical to the assessment of retailer 
market power. 
 
Using a unique micro dataset, this paper examines retailer pricing behavior for avocados, 
in particular the effects of the underlying demand and cost factors on determination of 
retail prices. The study also provides evidence regarding the effectiveness of the avocado 
industry’s promotion policies in view of retailer pricing behavior for avocados. Although 
the application is for avocados, a key California specialty commodity, the methodologies 
developed and the results achieved in this study should have broad applications across the 
food industry and the grocery retail market. 
 
The study illustrates that retail prices for avocados were highly dispersed both spatially 
and  temporarily.  There  was  evident  heterogeneity  of  retail  prices  for  avocados  of 
different sizes sold at different retail chains and in different markets. The analysis shows 
the existence of a “regular” retail price for avocados. Downward deviations from the 
“regular”  price  dominated  changes  in  retail  prices,  in  particular,  temporary  price 
reductions accounted for 27 percent of quarterly retail price variations. 
 
The study examines how retailers adjust retail prices in response to changes in demand 
and cost factors. We conclude that costs are not a primary factor in setting retail prices 
for avocados. Retailers’ sales strategies, which reflect decreases in retail margins rather 
than decreases in costs, explained much of the observed temporary price reductions for 
avocados.  Retail  prices  for  avocados  also  exhibited  countercyclical  movements  over 
seasonal  demand  cycles.  The  findings  provide  support  for  Lal  and  Matutes’  (1994) 
hypothesis that retailers reduce prices or margins during a product’s high-demand periods 
in order to compete with each other for consumers’ store patronage.  
 
Other noteworthy results include the fact that retail margins increased significantly as 
shipment volumes increased, indicating the presence of retailer oligopsony power. Also 
notable was the rather strong evidence that retail prices were significantly lower as a 
function  of  the  amount  of  avocados  imported  from  Chile  and  Mexico,  meaning  that 
consumers have benefited from trade liberalization for avocados. 
 
How  retailers  set  price  in  response  to  demand  shocks  is  important  in  the  context  of 
agricultural industries’ efforts to promote and market their products. The approach of 
“Difference-in-Difference” is employed to evaluate the effects of the California Avocado 
Commission’s  (CAC)  promotion  programs  on  retail  price  and  sales.  The  analysis 
demonstrates  that  the  radio  campaign  and  outdoor  advertisements  were  successful  in   2 
raising avocado sales. There is no evidence that retailers charged higher prices during the 
CAC’s promotions. Nonetheless, the CAC’s promotion programs could be enhanced if 
retailers were better informed about the advertising campaigns. 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: F13, L13, L66, L81, M30, Q13, Q17.     3 
 
I.  Introduction 
Rising concentration and consolidation of sales among large supermarket chains in the 
U.S. and other countries, due in part to a recent wave of mergers in food retailing,
1 have 
made retailers’ role in the food industry a topical issue. Several conceptual bases and 
empirical evidence support the hypothesis that grocery retailers are likely to possess some 
degree of market power in the sense of influencing the prices they pay to suppliers and 
charge to consumers. These considerations include the multiproduct nature of retailing 
and consumers’ preferences for one-stop shopping, the spatial dimension of retail markets, 
imperfect information, differentiation of marketing strategies among retailers, and the 
rising concentration in local food retail markets.
2 Most likely, the key question is not 
whether  retailers  have  the  ability  to  influence  price,  but,  rather,  the  extent  and 
implications of that influence. Understanding retailer pricing behavior is critical to the 
assessment of retailer market power.  
Using a unique micro dataset, this paper investigates retailer pricing issues for 
avocados, a key California specialty commodity, and analyzes the implications of retailer 
behavior for the effectiveness of avocado industry advertising programs. Through the 
                                                 
1 See Kaufman (2000), Kaufman et al. (2000), and Harris et al. (2002) for recent summaries of merger and 
acquisition activities in U.S. grocery retailing. See Cooper (2003) and Dobson, Waterson, and Davies (2003) 
for summaries of concentration issues in European food retailing. 
2 For discussions of the multiproduct nature of grocery shopping and retailing, see Bliss (1988), Giulietti 
and Waterson (1997), Lal and Matutes (1994), and Hosken and Reiffen (2001, 2004b); for discussions of 
food  retailing  from  a  spatial  economics  perspective,  see  Benson  and  Faminow  (1985),  Faminow  and 
Benson  (1985),  Walden  (1990),  and  Azzam  (1999);  for  discussions  of  imperfect  information  in  retail 
markets, see Salop (1976, 1977), Salop and Stiglitz (1977, 1982), Varian (1980), Sobel (1984), Lal and 
Matutes  (1994),  Hosken  and  Reiffen  (2001,  2004b),  and  Pesendorfer  (2002);  for  discussions  of 
differentiation of pricing and marketing strategies among retailers, see Salop and Stiglitz (1982), Varian 
(1980), Lal and Rao (1997), Boatwright, Dhar, and Rossi (2004), Pesendorfer (2002), and Sexton, Zhang, 
and Chalfant (2003); for discussions of concentration and retailer market power, see Cotterill’s (1993) part 
5 for a debate on the issue of market power in grocery retailing, and Connor (1999) and Wright (2001) for 
recent critiques of research into the concentration-price relationship in grocery retailing.   4 
auspices of the California Avocado Commission, the industry expends over $5 million 
annually for advertising programs in the U.S. 
Empirical studies, such as Pesendorfer (2002), and Sexton, Zhang, and Chalfant 
(SZC, 2003), document a remarkable degree of cross-sectional price dispersion among 
food retailers within a SMSA and intertemporal price variations for a given retailer. For 
example,  some  retailers  choose  to  maintain  very  stable  retail  prices  for  produce 
commodities, despite large fluctuations in the price at the farm gate, while other retailers 
use produce commodities as frequent sale items (SZC, 2003).  In general, variations in 
retail prices seem at best loosely related to changes in wholesale prices (MacDonald, 
2000; Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (CKR), 2003; SZC, 2003; Hosken and Reiffen, 
2004a, 2004b; Li and Sexton, 2005). There is also a growing body of evidence that retail 
prices fall in periods of high demand (e.g., Warner and Barsky, 1995; MacDonald, 2000; 
CKR, 2003; Hosken and Reiffen, 2004b), a result inconsistent with a perfect competition 
model of pricing, or with standard models of oligopoly, such as Bertrand or Cournot. 
Although the possibility of retailer market power in selling to consumers has been 
studied extensively (see footnote 2), retailers’ role as buyers from commodity shippers 
and food manufacturers has received comparatively little attention. Both the structure of 
these  markets  and  emerging  trade  practices  suggest  the  increasing  retailer  power  in 
procurement activities in the produce industry (Rogers and Sexton, 1994; Calvin, Cook, 
et al., 2001). Prior research has shown that retail buyers may be able to capture large 
shares of the market surplus for produce commodities (Sexton and Zhang, 1996; Richards 
and Patterson, 2003; SZC, 2003). 
These  issues  of  retailer  pricing  behavior  are  of  particular  importance  in  the 
context of agricultural industries’ efforts to promote and market their products. Many   5 
agricultural  industries  have  utilized  industry-wide  promotion  programs  funded  by 
producer and/or handler assessments as a tool to increase sales and producer incomes. 
Expenditures on these programs in California alone totaled $141.5 million in 2002.  
Various  studies  have  shown  that  these  programs  are  often  quite  successful  in 
generating a high return on the dollars invested (Kaiser et al. 2005). However, most of 
these studies have been conducted using aggregate, industry-wide data (e.g., Alston et al. 
1997, 1998; Carman and Craft, 1998) and, thus, can provide little guidance in terms of 
targeting advertising to cities or retailers, and determining which types of campaigns are 
most effective. Moreover, little is known about how the effectiveness of these programs 
is facilitated or impeded by retailers’ own pricing strategies. For example, if retailers 
respond to a commodity advertising campaign by raising prices to consumers to absorb 
any demand increase induced by the promotion, the higher sales that are needed to induce 
an increase in the producer price will not materialize. 
The rest of paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews literature on retailer 
pricing behavior and studies on trade practices in the produce industry. Section III gives 
an  overview  of  the  Californian  avocado  industry.  Datasets  utilized  in  this  study  are 
described  in  Section  IV.  Section  V  provides  descriptive  documentation  of  several 
important features of retailer pricing behavior for avocados. The approach of Difference-
in-Difference,  which  is  employed  to  identify  the  “treatment  effects”  of  the  CAC’s 
promotion  programs,  is  discussed  in  Section  VI.  Section  VII  presents  the  empirical 
models and hypothesis tests that examine retail sales and retailer pricing behavior for 
avocados. Section VIII discusses the results, and Section IX concludes.   6 
II.  Literature Review 
Most retail markets are characterized by a large degree of price variations manifested 
both  spatially  and  temporarily  instead  of  by  the  “law  of  one  price”.  Grocery  retail 
markets exhibit temporal price variations, with stores deliberately varying their prices 
over time, and cross-section price dispersion with stores offering an identical item at 
different prices at any point of time (Pesendorfer, 2002; SZC, 2003).  
Temporary price reduction is a widely observed phenomenon in the grocery retail 
market. It is a common observation that only a small fraction of numerous goods carried 
by grocery retailers are offered at low “sale” prices each week, and those selected items 
tend to change over time. Hosken and Reiffen (2004a) analyze retail prices for twenty 
categories of grocery goods in thirty geographic areas. They show that a typical grocery 
product  has  a  “regular”  price,  and  that  most  deviations  from  the  regular  price  are 
downward and short-lived. Temporary price reductions account for 20 to 50 percent of 
annual variations in retail prices for the grocery products in their study. Li and Sexton 
(2005) also find a similar price pattern for lettuce and bagged salad products at twenty 
retail chains in six metropolitan areas in the U.S. Temporary price reductions explain 20 
and 45 percent of annual variations in retail prices for lettuce and bagged salad products, 
respectively. However, variations in retail prices seem loosely related to changes in the 
prices in the upstream market (MacDonald, 2000; CKR, 2003; SZC, 2003; Hosken and 
Reiffen, 2004a, 2004b; Li and Sexton, 2005). 
Trade  practices  in  the  produce  industry  suggest  that  retail  chains  usually  buy 
produce commodities directly from grower-shippers rather than buy from local wholesale 
markets (Calvin, Cook, et al., 2001). This is also true in the avocado industry. Under the 
classical models of the farm-retail price spread (e.g., George and King, 1971), where   7 
retailers add some type of fixed or percentage markup to the raw product price, we would 
expect changes in shipping-point prices to pass through to retail prices, possibly with 
some lag.  
Concentration  in  the  food  retail  sector  leads  to  suspicions  about  retailers’ 
oligopsony  power  in  buying  from  food  manufacturers  or  producers.  Emerging  trade 
practices between fresh produce shippers and food retailers also suggest the increasing 
retailer power in procurement practices (Calvin, Cook, et al., 2001). Traditionally, the 
fresh  produce  industry  has  emphasized  daily,  spot-market  sales.  However,  the  use  of 
price  arrangements,  such  as  advance  pricing  and  short-  and  long-term  contacts,  is 
becoming more common.
 3 One of the consequences of these price arrangements is that 
seasonal supply shocks from the farm level may not effectively transmit to the retail level.  
Moreover,  the  economic  basis  for  concerns  about  buyer  power  is  strong, 
particularly for specialty commodities such as fresh fruits and vegetables, where shippers 
are  small  and  unconcentrated  relative  to  buyers,  and  often  sell  highly  perishable 
commodities  (Rogers  and  Sexton,  1994).  Evidence  suggests  that  buyers  use  large 
harvests (abundant supplies) to further bid down prices for perishable commodities and 
increase the farm-retail price spread during those periods (Sexton and Zhang, 1996; SZC, 
2003). 
On the side of selling to consumers, grocery retailers conduct temporary price 
reductions on a regular basis. This suggests that these price changes are not due entirely 
to random shocks in costs or demand. Empirical evidence suggests that temporary price 
reductions are attributable to retailers’ sales strategies, which are the result of decreases 
                                                 
3 Advance-pricing agreements typically specify a price ceiling, commonly referred as a lid price, for an 
estimated volume in a certain future period (usually a few weeks in advance). However, they do not involve 
a formal purchase commitment (Calvin, Cook, et al., 2001).   8 
in margins rather than decreases in costs (MacDonald, 2000; CKR, 2003; Hosken and 
Reiffen, 2004a, 2004b; Li and Sexton, 2005). Attempts have been made in the literature 
on  retailer  pricing  behavior  to  understand  the  existence  and  persistence  of  the  sale 
phenomenon. 
A  seminal  paper  by  Salop  and  Stiglitz  (1977)  offers  an  explanation  for  the 
observation  that  several  stores  contemporaneously  offer  an  identical  item  at  different 
prices. They consider a single-product market with two kinds of consumers. Consumers 
differ  in  their  costs  of  information  acquisition.  Stores  behave  as  monopolistically 
competitive  price  setters  with  zero  profits.  Salop  and  Stiglitz  show  that  for  some 
parameter  configurations,  a  two-price  equilibrium  exists.  Low  information-cost 
consumers  are  informed  about  the  entire  distribution  of  the  offered  prices,  and  high 
information-cost consumers choose to remain uninformed about the price distribution. 
Hence,  informed  consumers  always  go  to  a  low-priced  store,  while  uninformed 
consumers  shop  at  random.  In  the  equilibrium,  some  stores  sell  at  the  perfectly 
competitive  price  (minimum  average  cost),  and  the  rest  only  sell  to  uninformed 
consumers  at  a  higher  price.  The  lower  volume  of  the  high-price  stores  exactly 
compensates for the higher profit per sale, which ensures the zero profit condition in the 
equilibrium. 
Based on Salop and Stiglitz’s model, some stores sell the product permanently at 
a lower price than other stores. Varian (1980) points out that if consumers can learn from 
experience, the persistence of price dispersion seems rather implausible. Varian shows 
how stores may find it in their interests to randomize prices of an identical product in an 
attempt to price discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers. Similar to 
Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Varian assumes two types of consumers. In each period, each   9 
retailer  randomly  chooses  a  price  from  a  continuous  price  distribution,  and  decides 
between obtaining a high price and selling only to those uninformed consumers, and 
charging  a  low  price  and  selling  to  informed  consumers  as  well.  Retailers  earn  zero 
profits.  
Varian shows that the resulting monopolistically competitive equilibrium features 
mixed strategies, in which each retailer changes its price each period and no specific 
price is charged with positive probability mass. Stores tend to charge extreme prices with 
higher probability, either the perfectly competitive price (the average cost associated with 
the  number  of  customers)  or  the  monopolistically  competitive  price  (the  reservation 
price), than they charge intermediate prices. 
Lal and Matutes (1994) utilize the multiproduct nature of retailing and develop a 
model to explore equilibrium pricing and advertising strategies of retailers. In their model, 
retailers  compete  with  each  other  by  conducting  advertised  sales  in  order  to  attract 
consumers into the store and earn profit from other goods that consumers buy if they visit 
the store. They assume that there is only one type of consumer, who does not know the 
price  of  a  product  unless  it  is  advertised.  Advertising  conveys  price  information  to 
consumers,  and  consumers  (correctly)  believe  that  any  product  whose  price  is  not 
advertised will yield zero surplus, i.e., retailers charge consumers their reservation values 
for  all  non-advertised  products.  Based  on  this  expectation,  a  consumer’s  decision  on 
which store to visit is based on the surplus derived from the purchase of an assortment of 
goods.  Lal  and  Matutes  show  that  one  of  the  two  equilibria  results  in  both  firms 
advertising the same good, and for a wide range of parameters the advertised good is sold 
below marginal cost.    10 
Since the model is static, Lal and Matutes do not explain why the goods chosen to 
be  advertised  change  weekly.  Nor  does  the  model  provide  any  predictions  for  the 
dynamics  of  retail  pricing.  The  model  is  constructed  under  a  simple  setting  where 
retailers  only  sell  two  products,  with  one  more  popular  than  the  other.  A  typical 
supermarket carries thousands of products, and offers a bundle of goods on sale each 
week.  It  is  reasonable  that  retailers  differentiate  themselves  from  each  other  by 
advertising different items each period and promoting a product at different periods of 
time. Such strategies can prevent consumers from learning from experience. Hosken and 
Reiffen (2001, 2004b) extend the analysis of Lal and Matutes (1994) to a multiproduct 
setting. They predict that there should be considerable variation in the frequency and 
magnitude of sales across products in a dynamic framework. 
Both  Varian  (1980)  and  Lal  and  Matutes  (1994)  show  that  retailers  have 
incentives  to  cut  retail  price  despite  that  there  is  no  changes  in  costs  or  demand. 
Therefore, both theories have offered explanations for a weak relationship between retail 
price variation and changes in costs. On the other hand, empirical studies, such as Warner 
and Barsky (1995), MacDonald (2000), CKR (2003), and Hosken and Reiffen (2004b), 
have  found  that  retail  prices  fall  in  periods  of  high  demand.  These  findings  are  not 
consistent with the models of perfect competition or standard oligopoly (e.g., Cournot or 
Bertrand), which predict that firms do not change or raise prices given a positive demand 
shock. 
Although  Varian  did  not  examine  how  retailers’  pricing  regime  changes  in 
response to a demand shock, his model implies that retailers’ motivation to hold sales and 
the  mixed  strategies  sustains  during  the  high  demand  period.  Nevertheless,  under  a 
single-product  framework,  the  model  offers  no  indication  for  how  the  probability  of   11 
holding sales changes if demand increases. Lal and Matutes (1994) predict that retailers 
are  likely  to  have  “popular”  products  that  have  higher  demand  on  sale,  in  order  to 
compete for consumers’ store patronage. Therefore, the model implies that a product is 
more likely to be on sale during its peak demand periods. 
Furthermore,  Warner  and  Barsky  (1995)  explain  the  countercyclical  price 
movement as the result of economies of scale in consumer search. Consumers engage in 
more  searching  and  traveling  between  stores  during  peak  demand  periods,  such  as 
Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays, than at the other times. Consumers’ demands, thus, 
are more price elastic when the overall demand is high. Consequently, retailers lower 
prices when the overall demand is high. 
One distinction between the explanations by Lal and Matutes and by Warner and 
Barsky is that Warner and Barsky predict that, holding other factors constant, retail prices 
fall during the aggregate demand peaks, but not during the idiosyncratic demand peaks. 
However, according to Lal and Matutes, retailers are more likely to put a product on sale 
during  its  high  demand  periods,  even  though  its  idiosyncratic  demand  peaks  do  not 
coincide with the aggregate demand peaks during holidays. Secondly, Lal and Matutes 
suggest that retailers put a product on sale under its ordinary demand condition as long as 
it is among the list of the “popular” products. In contrast, Warner and Barsky do not offer 
an explanation for retailers’ frequent sales behavior. The model implies that retailers have 
no motivation to reduce retail prices or retail markups, when the aggregate consumer 
demand is low. 
CKR (2003) analyze the countercyclical price movement over demand cycles by 
using retailer scanner data on twenty nine categories of grocery products sold at 100 
stores of the Dominick’s Finer Foods retail chain in Chicago metropolitan area between   12 
1989 and 1996. Their findings support the prediction by Lal and Matutes that retailers 
compete  with  each  other  by  advertising  sales  for  products  with  high  demand  and, 
therefore, retail prices are lower during demand peaks. Our study is different from CKR 
(2003) in terms of analyzing the effects of demand shocks on retailer pricing behavior in 
at least three ways. First, CKR study manufactured grocery products at retail stores of 
one retail chain in the Chicago area, while this study focuses on avocados, a perishable 
produce, sold at a wide range of retail chains in a broad set of market areas. Second, in 
addition to examining retail prices and margins, we also estimate a model for retailers’ 
decisions on temporary price reductions. Third, we look into retailer pricing behavior in 
response  to  both  seasonal  demand  shocks  and  the  demand  shock  generated  by  the 
industry’s promotions, whereas CKR focus on the effects of seasonal demand cycles. 
Examining  how  retailers  set  price  in  response  to  positive  demand  shocks  is 
important  to  evaluating  the  industry’s  promotion  programs.  Consumer  advertising 
programs, such as media advertisements, have been widely utilized to increase demand 
for a product. Retailers, according to Warner and Barsky, do not reduce retail prices or 
markups during the idiosyncratic demand peaks generated by product-specific promotion 
programs.  However,  Lal  and  Matutes  predict  that  retailers  will  conduct  sales  for  a 
product if a promotion campaign can successfully increase its demand. 
III. Avocado Production, Trade, and Promotion 
California  avocados,  with  average  annual  sales  of  $346  million  from  2001  to  2003, 
ranked fourth in farm value of production among California fruit crops (following grapes, 
strawberries, and oranges) and 16
th among all California crop and livestock commodities 
(California Agricultural Statistics, 2003). California produces 90 percent of the annual   13 
U.S. avocado crop, with Florida accounting for the remainder (Noncitrus Fruits and Nuts 
Summary, 1997-2004).
4 
This  study  focuses  on  the  Hass  avocado  variety,  which  is  only  produced  in 
California  in  the  U.S.  The  Hass  variety  accounts  for  about  92  percent  of  California 
avocado  production  and  97  percent  of  sales  revenue  for  the  five  varieties  with 
commercial production since 2001. Although produced throughout the year, production 
of  California  Hass  avocados  tends  to  be  seasonal,  with  very  low  production  during 
November and December, increasing to May and remaining high through September, and 
then decreasing through the end of October (figure 1). 
Due to the seasonal pattern of California avocado production, avocado supply in 
the U.S. is supplemented by imports. The Hass variety has comprised 90 percent of total 
U.S.  avocado  imports  since  2001.  Chile  is  the  largest  avocado  exporter  to  the  U.S., 
followed by Mexico. The two countries account for over 90 percent of total avocado 
imports and nearly all of the Hass imports. As shown in figure 1, avocado imports to the 
U.S. reveal a clear seasonal pattern that is counter to the seasonal pattern of the California 
avocado production. Imports of Chilean Hass avocados (CHA) occur throughout the year. 
CHA imports typically begin to increase in August, with the highest volumes occurring 
during September through December, and then decrease through March and remain very 
low until August. 
Trade barriers for Hass avocados from Mexico have been in place due to stated 
concerns about invasive pests and diseases. MHA could only enter Alaska in the U.S. 
before November 1997. There has been a progressive elimination of import restrictions 
on MHA since then. In November 1997, MHA were allowed to enter the continental U.S. 
                                                 
4 Hawaii accounts for less than 0.5 percent of the U.S avocado annual production.    14 
for the first time. Nineteen states and Washington D.C. allowed MHA imports during 
November—February each year, beginning in November 1997. Seasonal MHA imports 
were intended originally to complement the domestic supply and fill the natural void 
caused by lower domestic production in the late fall and winter, while minimizing risks 
of introducing pests and diseases from Mexico. A second trade liberalization occurred in 
November  2001  when  MHA  were  allowed  to  enter  twelve  additional  states,  and  the 
import season was expanded to a six-month period, from October 15 to April 15 each 
year. Finally, beginning on January 31, 2005, MHA imports were allowed to enter all U.S. 
states except California and Florida year around. California and Florida are slated to open 
their markets to MHA after January 31, 2007. 
Avocado imports increased dramatically after the fourth quarter in 1998, while the 
domestic production fluctuated during this period (figure 1). The average annual growth 
rates were 35 percent for total avocado imports, 37 percent for Chilean avocado imports, 
and 55 percent for Mexican avocado imports during 1997—2004. The share of Chilean 
avocado imports remained stable, 66 percent on average during 1996—2004. The share 
of  avocado  imports  emanating  from  Mexico  increased  from  7  percent  in  1996  to  27 
percent in 2004 accompanied by decreases in imports from other exporters, such as the 
Dominican Republic. Meanwhile avocado consumption has increased steadily during the 
same period, with an average annual growth rate of 10 percent. The share of domestic 
consumption supplied by California declined from 82 percent in 1996 to 55 percent in 
2004. 
Promotions  are  a  prospectively  important  tool  to  help  the  California  avocado 
industry remain competitive in the face of increasing import competition. The industry 
expended $10 million annually during 2002—2004 on its combined marketing programs   15 
conducted through the auspices of the California Avocado Commission (CAC). Specific 
marketing  efforts  have  taken  a  variety  of  forms,  including  consumer  advertising, 
merchandising,  promotions  directed  to  food  service,  and  public  relations.  Consumer 
advertising received the greatest percentage of marketing program funds, averaging 50 
percent of total marketing program expenditure during this period. 
The  CAC’s  advertising  programs  are  conducted  in  eleven  or  twelve  selected 
markets  each  year,
5 and  are  broken  down  into  three  categories  by  media  type:  radio 
advertising, outdoor displays, and magazine advertising.
6 Radio advertising received on 
average 61 percent of all advertising dollars during 2002—2004. Radio promotions are 
conducted four times for three-week periods between February and mid-July each year. 
Outdoor promotions are held during the intervals between radio promotions in all the 
selected markets except Atlanta, and involve displays of billboards and posters. Outdoor 
displays accounted for 21 percent of the advertising expenditure for the same period. 
Magazine  advertising  has  taken  place  only  in  Atlanta,  which  is  considered  as  a 
developing market by the CAC. Information cards and/or flyers are placed in some issues 
of some magazines sold in Atlanta. 
The only prior evaluation of avocado industry advertising programs is the work of 
Carman and Craft (1998), who analyze the CAC’s promotion programs using aggregate 
annual data from 1961-95. This study indicates that avocado advertising was effective on 
balance, yielding an average return of $7 per $1 expended on advertising. However, it 
does not provide evidence on demand responses to different promotion activities at the 
                                                 
5 The selected markets for the CAC’s promotion programs are Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco, 
Sacramento, Phoenix, Dallas, San Antonio, Houston, Denver, Portland, Seattle, and Atlanta.  The CAC 
stopped its promotions in Denver after 2002, and began its promotions in Phoenix and Seattle in 2001.  
6 Eighty-five percent of consumer advertising funds were spent on radio advertising, outdoor displays, and 
magazine advertising during 2002—2004. The rest were used to cover administration costs (8.6%), and 
were spent on other programs (6.4%), such as coupon program.    16 
disaggregated level. In addition, little is known about how retailers’ pricing strategies 
interact with and modify the effectiveness of this and other industry promotion programs. 
The data set available for this study provides us an unprecedented opportunity to assess 
these issues. 
IV. The Data 
We were able to assemble a unique and comprehensive dataset through the cooperation 
of  the  CAC  and  its  marketing  agent—Fusion  Marketing.  The  specific  data  sources 
include weekly retailer scanner data provided by Information Resources Inc. (IRI) for 82 
major  U.S.  retail  accounts  across  38  markets  for  avocados  from  November  2001  to 
October 2004. A “retail account” refers to a particular market-retail chain combination, 
e.g., Retailer 1 in Chicago. Data for 46 retail chains are included. We are not able to 
reveal the names of retail chains due to the agreement with IRI. The weekly data include 
volume and dollar sales, and retail prices. We focus on large and small sizes of Hass 
avocados, which were carried by most of the retail accounts and accounted for over 90 
percent of the total category sales. The marketing year for avocados, which runs from 
Mid-October through Mid-October in the following calendar year, is used in our analysis 
instead of calendar year. 
Second, we were provided access to information on the media types, geographic 
locations, and the timing of the advertising programs conducted by the CAC during the 
study period. Third, the CAC provided weekly shipment data, including shipping-point 
prices  and  shipment  volumes  of  Hass  avocados  from  California  to  each  of  the  38 
destination markets during the study period. The weekly shipping-point prices are the 
average  weekly  prices  charged  by  shippers  for  shipments  to  each  of  the  destination   17 
markets.  These  prices  exceed  the  farm-gate  prices  by  amounts  that  reflect  shippers’ 
inventory and transactions costs and provide a better reflection of what retailers in each 
destination market actually paid than do the farm-gate prices. Fourth, we obtained data on 
monthly volumes and values of total Hass imports to the U.S., and the Hass imports from 
Chile and Mexico to the U.S. from the United States International Trade Commission 
(USITC).  
V.  Retailers’ Pricing Behavior for Hass Avocados 
California avocados were shipped to 65 destination markets in the U.S. during 2002—
2004 marketing year. The top five, ten, and twenty markets accounted for 46, 68, and 88 
percent of the total sales of California Hass avocados respectively during this period. Los 
Angeles was the largest destination for California Hass avocados during this period, with 
a 21 percent share of shipments. San Francisco, Dallas, San Antonio, Sacramento, and 
Houston each had a market share for shipments between five and seven percent over this 
period. The rest of the destination markets each had a less than 5 percent market share for 
shipments. In this section, we present a descriptive analysis of retailers’ pricing behavior 
for Hass avocados for some retail markets to illustrate the range of pricing practices by 
the retail accounts in the sample.  
Table 1 reports means, standard deviations, and ranges between the 25
th and 75
th 
quartiles,  and  the  minimum  and  maximum  values  of  retail  prices  and  shipping-point 
prices per unit for “large” and “small” Hass avocados in seven U.S. cities. Panel (a) 
shows that the shipping-point price accounted for less than half of the retail price for 
Hass avocados on average for all markets in the data. Statistics in panel (b) are at the 
retail account level, e.g., Dallas 1 means retailer 1 in Dallas. Panel (b) illustrates the   18 
evident heterogeneity of retail prices for different sizes, at different retail accounts, and in 
different markets. Retailers’ pricing strategies were diverse in many cases in terms of (i) 
average price for each size, (ii) variability of price around the mean, and (iii) pricing 
relationships between large and small avocados. For example, the ranges of means and 
standard deviations of price for large avocados for the retail accounts in Phoenix were 
from $1.35 to $1.85 and from 0.27 to 0.59, respectively. Several retailers (Baltimore 1, 
Dallas  2,  Denver  3,  and  Seattle  2  and  3)  charged  similar  prices  for  large  and  small 
avocados, while others (Los Angeles 2 and 3, Dallas 1, Denver 1, Phoenix 1 and 2, and 
Seattle 1 and 4) discounted small avocados sharply, and some retailers carried only large 
avocados (Los Angeles 4 and Baltimore 3).  
However, as shown in panel (c), means and standard deviations of shipping-point 
prices to different destination markets were close and had negligible deviations from the 
averages  across  all  markets.  Therefore,  shipping-point  prices  do  not  exhibit  much 
heterogeneity across markets and, thus, do not contribute to explaining the heterogeneity 
across markets in retail prices. 
Table 2 summarizes the results of Scheffe multiple-comparison tests of the null 
hypothesis of equality of means of retail prices between retailers in the same market, and 
Chi-square tests for the null hypothesis of equality of variances of retail prices in the 
same market. The test results indicate that both means and variances differ significantly 
for the vast majority of retail accounts and for both large and small avocados. 
Table 3 reports the correlations of retail prices between retail accounts and the 
correlations  between  retail  prices  and  shipping-point  prices  in  six  markets.  The 
correlation  coefficients  further  demonstrate  the  heterogeneity  in  retailers’  pricing 
behavior and the tenuous linkage between farm and retail prices. Correlations of prices   19 
among retail chains within the same city are rarely higher than 0.5, and are negative in 
some  cases.  Although  shipping-point  prices  for  large  and  small  avocados  are  highly 
correlated, the correlation of prices between large and small avocados within the same 
retail account (highlighted in gray) is typically low and sometimes even negative (e.g., 
retailers 4 and 5 in Dallas and retailer 2 in Phoenix), despite the fact that these prices 
were subject to the same shipping-point price shocks and cost shocks at the retail account 
level, demonstrating that cost shocks are often not an important factor in determining 
retail price variations. 
Consider  the  correlations  between  retail  prices  and  shipping-point  prices.  
Avocados are a perishable fruit.
7  Based upon the limited storage period for avocados, the 
lagged response of retail prices to shipping-point prices should not be more than two 
weeks. Table 3 includes correlations between retail prices and shipping-point prices in 
the current period and lagged one week. Avocados are sold directly from grower-shippers 
to retailers, and, therefore, we might anticipate a strong link between shipping-point and 
retail prices. However, nearly all the correlations are below 0.5, most are below 0.2, and 
in some cases the correlations are negative—e.g., in Dallas, Chicago, and Phoenix. This 
general conclusion holds for both contemporaneous and lagged shipping-point prices. 
Table 4 illustrates the patterns of variations in retail prices for Hass avocados. 
First, a quarterly (an annual) modal price is computed for each size of Hass avocado sold 
by  each  retail  account  in  each  quarter  (year).  Second,  we  compute  the  average 
frequencies of retail prices equal to, or larger than, or less than the quarterly (annual) 
modes  across  all  retail  accounts  and  over  time  for  each  size  of  Hass  avocados.  The 
                                                 
7 Avocados can be stored less than 10 days at room temperature and less than two weeks under cooling. 
The CAC recommends that shippers “pre-condition” avocados to achieve a better appearance and prevent 
damage from chilling.  Avocados can usually be stored less than 10 days after pre-conditioning.   20 
frequencies computed by the quarterly modal prices are reported outside and to the left of 
the  parentheses,  and  those  computed  by  the  annual  model  prices  are  reported  in  the 
parentheses.  Retail  prices  stayed  at  the  quarterly  (annual)  modes  for  21  percent  (13 
percent) of time, and retail prices were below its quarterly (annual ) mode for 62 (58) 
percent of time.  
Third, we compute the average frequencies of retail prices above or below the 
quarterly (annual) modes by 10, or 20, or 30 percent. Retail prices were less likely to go 
above the quarterly (annual) modal prices by 20 or 30 percent. In contrast, retail prices 
were below both modal prices by 20 or 30 percent for 21 or 30 percent of the time. 
Finally, we construct a retail price index as the ratio of retail price over its quarterly 
(annual) mode. The means of the retail prices indices computed by both quarterly and 
annual modal prices are below one for both sizes of Hass avocados. 
Consistent  with  findings  by  Hosken  and  Reiffen  (2004a),
8 we  find  that  there 
existed a “regular” price for avocados, and most deviations from the “regular” price were 
downward. In particular, we define that a temporary price reduction occurs if the retail 
price is below its quarterly modal price by 20 percent. Because the weekly data offer 
sufficient frequency, we use quarterly modal prices to capture seasonal changes in means 
of retail prices. Temporary price reductions accounted for 26 and 28 percent of quarterly 
variations in retail prices for small and large Hass avocados, respectively. 
Figure 2 displays histograms for the retail price indices and shipping-point price 
indices computed by quarterly modal prices for each size of Hass avocados. The kernel 
density is estimated by the Epanechnidov kernel function. The density estimations fit the 
                                                 
8 Hosken and Reffein (2004a) analyze retail price variations by using monthly data at the market level. 
Annual model prices are used to compute the percentage of observations on, or above, or below the annual 
modes.    21 
histograms in lines. The shipping-point price indices are computed for the convenience of 
comparison. We compute a quarterly modal price for each size of Hass avocados shipped 
from California to each destination market in each quarter in each year. Because there 
exist  multiple  modes  for  shipping-point  prices  in  many  cases,  we  use  the  highest 
quarterly modes in such cases. The retail price indices equal to one were realized with 
probability mass, but the shipping-point price indices did not have any dominant value 
with significantly high probability. The distributions of the shipping-point price indices 
are  symmetric  compared  with  the  distributions  of  the  retail  price  indices,  which  are 
evidently asymmetric, flatter to the right of the modes than to the left. 
Varian (1980) suggests that the distributions for retail prices are U-shaped in that 
the highest and lowest prices are charged with higher probability than intermediate prices. 
For grocery shopping, it is conceivable that fixed costs to acquire price information are 
considerable and the number of uninformed consumers is relatively large. Varian predicts 
that high prices will be charged a high percentage of the time in such situation.  
The observed distributions of the retail price indices for Hass avocados revealed 
some evidence that supports Varian’s predictions. The quarterly modal prices were above 
means with notably high frequencies, 21 percent on average. In addition, decreases in 
retail  prices  dominated  variations  in  retail  prices,  since  retail  prices  were  below  the 
quarterly modal price for 62 percent of the time. Notice that Varian focuses on retail price 
variations given constant costs. Hence, Varian’s predictions are  essentially applied to 
retail margins. Although the distributions of the retail price indices are obviously not U-
shaped, we can not conclude that the observed price distributions are incompatible with 
those  predicted  by  Varian.  Nonetheless,  important  characteristics  of  retail  price 
distributions that we have shown have presented some evidence for Varian’s predictions.   22 
In  summary,  our  descriptive  analysis  of  retailer  pricing  behavior  reveals 
substantial  heterogeneity  among  retailers  in  pricing,  and  provides  no  indication  of 
coordination among retailers within the same market area in pricing avocados. Second, 
the correlations between retail prices and shipping-point prices are low, indicating that 
retailers’ costs are not a primary factor determining the prices set at retail. Third, we also 
illustrate the existence of a “regular” retail price for avocados. Downward deviations 
from the “regular” price dominated changes in retail prices, in particular, temporary price 
reductions accounted for 27 percent of retail price variations. Finally, we find that retail 
prices  distributions  were  distinct  from  the  distributions  of  shipping-point  prices.  Our 
findings provide support for Varian’s predications about retail pricing. 
VI. Identification of the “Treatment Effects” of the CAC’s Promotion Programs 
The approach of Difference in Difference (DID) is employed to examine how retailers set 
prices in response to the CAC’s promotions, and to evaluate the promotional effects of 
the  CAC’s  advertising  programs  on  retail  sales.  The  DID  approach  has  been  applied 
broadly in studies on program and policy evaluations, such as Card’s (1990) assessment 
of the effects of immigration on native wages and employment and Angrist and Levy’s 
(1999) analysis of the effect of class size on student test scores. Despite substantial prior 
research on evaluation of promotion programs, few have utilized the DID approach. To 
our  knowledge,  the  only  study  is  Busse,  Silva-Risso,  and  Zettelmeyer  (2004),  who 
analyze the effects of asymmetry information in the bargaining process on transaction 
prices under cash rebate promotions in the car industry. 
We discuss the DID approach in the context of evaluating the effect of the CAC’s 
promotion  programs  on  retail  prices  following  Ashenfelter  and  Card  (1985),  who   23 
evaluate  the  effect  of  job  training  on  earnings.  The  DID  approach  is  also  applied  to 
evaluate  other  outcome  measures,  such  as  retail  margins,  retailers’  decisions  on 
temporary  price  reductions,  and  retail  sales.  The  empirical  models  for  each  of  the 
outcomes are presented in the next section.  
The  fact  that  the  CAC  selected  a  set  of  markets  for  its  promotion  programs 
enables us to construct both treatment and control groups for the program evaluation. The 
DID  approach  estimates  the  counterfactual  outcomes  for  the  retail  accounts  in  the 
selected markets that received the CAC’s promotion programs. The DID framework for 
identifying  the  “treatment  effects”  of  the  CAC’s  promotions  on  retail  prices  can  be 
presented by the following linear model: 
 (1)                            ) , ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( t a t a D a t t a p ν ψ η δ + + + = , 
where p(a,t) denotes the price of avocados charged by retail account a at time t. Let the 
pre-treatment period, t = 0, be the period when there was no promotion, and let the post-
treatment period, t = 1, be the period when the CAC conducted its promotions. D(a,t)  
denotes whether a retail account was exposed to the CAC’s promotions or not. Suppose 
that only p(a,t) and D(a,t) are observed. We refer retail accounts that were exposed to the 
CAC’s promotion programs (i.e., D(a,1) = 1) as the “treated”, and those that were not 
exposed to the promotions (i.e., D(a,1) = 0) as the “controls”. D(a,0) equals zero for both 
the  treated  and  controls,  because  there  was  no  promotion  at  t  =  0.  ψ  represents  the 
“treatment  effects”  of  the  CAC’s  promotion  programs.  δ(t)  denotes  the  time-specific 
component,  η(a)  represents  the  account-specific  effects,  and  ν(a,t)  is  the  individual 
transitory error term with zero mean at both t = 0 and t = 1. The advantage of the panel 
data utilized in this study enables us to control idiosyncratic characteristics of individual 
retailers or markets by fixed effects.   24 
The  CAC  did  not  select  markets  for  its  promotion  programs  randomly.  The 
selected markets are among the top fifteen markets that have the largest market shares of 
avocado sales in the U.S., and did not allow MHA imports during the study period.
 9 A 
concern  usually  arises  about  selection  bias.  That  is, selection  for  promotions  may  be 
correlated with the individual transitory error term. However, the set of markets selected 
by the CAC for promotion has been quite stable since 1997. We believe that market 
selection for the CAC’s promotions is affected by market-specific characteristics that do 
not change during the study period, and, therefore, can be controlled by fixed effects.  
Under the assumption that selection for treatment is not correlated with the error 
term, we can obtain the difference in the expected retail prices with and without the 
CAC’s promotions for the retail accounts in the treated and control markets as 
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Notice  that  the  use  of  a  simple  comparison  of  retail  prices  before  and  after 
promotions to evaluate the promotional effects is likely to be biased by temporal trends in 
retail prices or by factors other than the promotions that occurred during both periods. 
The DID approach is applied to construct a counterfactual against which to measure the 
                                                 
9 An exception is Denver, where the CAC continued promoting avocados in 2002 after MHA imports were 
allowed to enter Colorado in November 2001, but the CAC discontinued its promotion programs in Denver 
after 2002.     25 
promotional effects. Therefore, the “treatment effects” of the CAC’s promotions, ψ, can 
be identified in the following form: 
{ }
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The DID estimator requires a strong assumption that the average outcomes for the 
treated and controls would have followed parallel paths over time in the absence of the 
treatment.  However,  a  complication  arises  in  our  application  because  shipping-point 
prices for avocados differ somewhat across market destinations, as table 1 documents. If 
retail prices at the stores in the treated markets were higher than retail prices at the stores 
in the control markets, it could be the result of the higher shipping-point prices in the 
treated  markets  relative  to  the  control  markets.  Therefore,  we  incorporate  the 
contemporaneous  and  lagged  market-specific  shipping-point  prices  as  explanatory 
variables to control for the difference in shipping-point prices between the treated and 
control markets.  
The  other  complication  is  that  different  markets  might  have  different  supply 
sources of Hass avocados other than California. Each of the markets selected for the 
CAC’s advertising programs is in a state that did not allow MHA imports during the 
study period (see footnote 10).  However, many markets in the control group in our data 
had access to MHA imports. The markets that allowed MHA imports likely had lower 
avocado acquisition costs during the months that MHA were available.
 10 The shipping-
                                                 
10 To get a sense of the price difference between domestic and imported avocados, we calculated the per lb. 
costs of avocados imported from Chile and Mexico as the landed duty-paid values of the imports divided 
by import volumes. This measure includes essentially all costs incurred in getting the imported product 
across the border and is comparable to a per lb. shipping-point price from California.  The following are the 
summary statistics for mean price/lb. over our November 2001—October 2004 sample period:  Mexican 
imports—$1.0061 (s.d. = 0.065), Chilean imports—$1.0781 (s.d. = 0.0210), California—$1.1668 (s.d. = 
0.2453).  Thus, Mexican (Chilean) imported avocados were about $0.17/lb. ($0.09/lb.) cheaper on average 
relative to California avocados.   26 
point  price  series  summarized  in  table  1  pertains  only  to  California  Hass  avocados. 
Therefore, retail prices in the treated markets could be higher than retail prices in the 
control  markets  during  some  periods  of  the  CAC’s  promotions  because  of  relatively 
higher avocado acquisition costs in the treated markets. 
We tackle this problem in two ways. First, we construct two different control 
groups. One control group includes markets that did not have access to MHA imports, 
and the other includes both markets that allowed and did not allow MHA imports. Second, 
we incorporate import volumes of MHA into the model when the control group includes 
both markets with and without access to MHA imports.  
Examining how retailers respond to changes in availability of imported avocados 
is  also  important  in  its  own  right.  In  addition  to  MHA  imports,  avocados  could  be 
imported without trade barriers from Chile. Therefore, import volumes of Chilean Hass 
avocado (CHA) are also incorporated in the model. CHA imports follow a clear seasonal 
pattern  that  basically  is  counter  to  the  seasonal  pattern  of  Californian  production,  as 
shown in figure 1. Because prices of imported avocados are lower on average than the 
California  shipping-point  prices  (see  footnote  11),  retailers  who  had  access  to  MHA 
and/or CHA imports should have had lower acquisition costs during that period, and, 
hence, lower retail prices during the import season of MHA, and when CHA imports are 
higher, to the extent these cost savings are passed forward to consumers. The failure of 
retail prices to adjust to the lower acquisition cost of imported avocados would be an 
indication that retailers were able to obtain larger margins during the import seasons and, 
hence, that retailers, and not consumers, were a major beneficiary of the benefits from 
free trade.   27 
The  DID  model  for  retail  prices  takes  the  following  form  after  adding  the 
shipping-point prices of California avocados and the Hass avocado imports from Mexico 
and Chile as covariates: 
(2)  ) , ( ) ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( t a v t impCH t a impMH t a w t a D a t t a p + + + + + + = ϑ λ θ ψ η δ , 
where w(a,t) denotes the California shipping-point price at time t in the market where the 
retail account a is located; impMH(a,t) represents MHA import volumes that are relevant 
to retail accounts in the states that allowed MHA imports at time t; and impCH(t) are 
import volumes of CHA at time t that are common to all the markets. In this generalized 
model, ψ is no longer the only term that accounts for the difference in the expected retail 
prices with and without promotions, and between accounts in the selected markets and 
control markets. However, ψ can still be identified as the “treatment effect” of the CAC’s 




] 0 ) 1 , ( | ) 0 , ( ) 1 , ( [
] 0 ) 1 , ( | ) 0 , ( ) 1 , ( [ ] 1 ) 1 , ( | ) 0 , ( ) 1 , ( [
] 0 ) 1 , ( | ) 0 , ( [ ] 0 ) 1 , ( | ) 1 , ( [
] 1 ) 1 , ( | ) 0 , ( [ ] 1 ) 1 , ( | ) 1 , ( [
= − +
= − − = − +
=
= − = −
= − =
a D a impMH a impMH
a D a w a w a D a w a w
a D a p E a D a p E




The  above  framework  is  applied  to  evaluate  three  types  of  the  CAC’s 
promotions—radio,  outdoor,  and  magazine  advertising  programs.  However,  the 
promotional effects of magazine advertisements might not be clearly identified. The DID 
approach requires unambiguous recognition of the periods with and without promotions. 
However,  the  timing  that  people  are  exposed  to  magazine  advertisements  is  highly 
uncertain. For example, people could purchase an issue of a monthly magazine at any 
time of the month, and read it at any time after that month.  In any event, magazine   28 
advertisements are of minor importance to our analysis, given that they were conducted 
only in Atlanta. 
In contrast, the promotional effects of both radio and outdoor programs can be 
identified under the DID framework. People could either be exposed to an advertisement 
directly at the same time, or obtain the information about the advertisement indirectly 
through other people. Since each radio or outdoor promotion lasted a fair amount of time, 
three  or  four  weeks  respectively,  we  expect  that  both  radio  and  outdoor  advertising 
programs generated promotional effects, if any, mostly during the promotion periods. A 
concern still rises about identifying possibly lagged effects of both radio and outdoor 
promotions. Because radio and outdoor promotions followed each other consecutively, 
the promotional coefficient of radio advertising could also pick up the lagged effects of 
the preceding outdoor promotions, and vice versa.  The data give us no good way to 
discriminate between these possibilities, but, notably, if the primary focus is the overall 
effectiveness of the CAC’s synchronized radio-and-outdoor-media campaign, separating 
the impacts of the individual components is unimportant. 
VII.  The Empirical Models and Hypothesis Tests 
We investigate retailer  pricing behavior for avocados, and evaluate the effects of the 
CAC’s promotion programs on both retail sales and retail pricing. In particular, three 
empirical models are estimated to examine retailers’ pricing strategies: a model of retail 
prices, a model of the farm-retail price spread, and a model for retailers’ decisions on 
temporary price reductions. In the following, we present empirical models for retailer 
pricing behavior and retail sales along with discussions on variable selection, estimation 
methods, and hypothesis tests.   29 
A Retail Pricing Model 
A retail pricing model is applied to capture retail price movements in response to changes 
in cost and demand factors. Based upon equation (2), the retail pricing model is specified 
in the following form: 
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where pa,s,t is the retail price measured by $/unit at retail account a for size s (s = {large, 
small}) in week t. α is the constant term. αt represents time-related control variables, 
which account for price variation over (i) marketing years, (ii) months, and (iii) holidays 
or special events. A marketing  year runs from Mid-October to Mid-October the next 
calendar year. Fixed effects, αa,s, are utilized for particular account-size combinations to 
control for heterogeneity in retailer pricing behavior. 
The set of terms in the first brackets measure the impacts of the CAC’s promotion 
programs. Radiot and Outdoort are set equal to one if the CAC was operating a radio or 
outdoor advertising program in week t. These two variables and the time-related control 
variables, αt, account for shocks common to all markets during the weeks of the CAC’s 
radio and outdoor advertising programs. Magazine promotions were conducted only in 
Atlanta  generally  on  a  monthly  basis.  Therefore,  monthly  dummies  can  control  the 
common  shocks  in  all  markets  during  the  CAC’s  magazine  promotions.  Radiom,t, 
Outdoorm,t, and Magazinem,t are the “treatment on the treated” variables, which are set 
equal to one if the CAC was running a radio, outdoor, or magazine promotion program in 
market m in week t. ψ2, ψ4, and ψ5 are the coefficients to be estimated that represent the   30 
“treatment effects” of the CAC’s radio, outdoor and magazine advertising programs on 
retail prices, respectively. 
wm,s,t  and  wm,s,t-1  in  the  second  set  of  brackets  are  the  shipping-point  prices 
measured by $/unit for size s avocados shipped from California to market m in week t and 
t-1.  The  shipping-point  price  and  its  one-week  lag  account  for  the  impact  of 
contemporaneous and lagged cost-side shocks on retailers’ prices.  A two-week period 
should represent a sufficient time period for changes in the shipping-point price for this 
highly perishable commodity to reflect fully in retailers’ acquisition costs (see footnote 8).   
The third and fourth sets of brackets contain terms for MHA and CHA imports, 
respectively. Seasont captures the common seasonal shocks for all the markets during the 
period when MHA imports were available, and it is set equal to one if MHA imports 
were  allowed  in  week  t.  The  variables  impMHm,t  and  impMHm,t-1  are  MHA  import 
volumes in 1,000,000 pounds in the current month and previous month, respectively. The 
import volumes of MHA are the total MHA imports to the U.S., but not market specific. 
The subscript m only indicates whether import volumes of MHA are relevant to market m 
that allowed MHA imports in week t. impMHm,t and impMHm,t-1, therefore, represent the 
“treatment  on  the  treated”.  The  variables  impCHt,  and  impCHt-1  in  the  fourth  set  of 
brackets have the same interpretation but apply to import volumes of CHA, which are 
relevant to all markets. All the import volumes are on a monthly basis. They represent the 
import volumes of MHA or CHA available in the month in which week t is located. 
Because the storage life expectancy is less than two weeks (see footnote 8), the lagged 
import  volumes  were  constructed  so  that  import  volumes  in  the  last  month  are  only 
relevant to the time prior to the middle of the current month.   31 






a,s,t a,s a,s,t 1 a,s,t
N(0, )
Var( )





ε = ρ ε +υ
￿
 
The  error  term  is  assumed  to  have  a  normal  distribution  with  zero  mean  and 
heteroskedastic variances for each of the account-size combinations. Second, the errors 
are assumed to be contemporaneously correlated between any account-size combinations. 
Furthermore, the error term is also assumed to follow an AR(1) process, and different 
autocorrelation parameters are allowed for different account-size combinations.  , , a s t ν is 
white  noise.  The  model  is  estimated  by  the  Prais-Winsten  method,  which  utilizes  a 
feasible generalized least squares estimation procedure conditioning on the assumed error 
structure. 
A model of the farm-retail price spreads 
The retail pricing model, however, cannot directly reflect how retail markups change over 
demand shocks. Therefore, we construct the farm-retail price spread as an approximation 
to the retail margin, and estimate a model of the farm-retail price spread. The dependent 
variable is the farm-retail price spread in $/unit for size s avocados at account a in week t. 
It is computed as the difference between retail price for size s avocados at retail account a 
in week t and the shipping-point price for size s avocados shipped from California to 
market m in week t.  
There  were  cases  when  California  Hass  avocados  were  not  shipped  to  some 
market during some period. If a market was not supplied by California for one or two   32 
weeks, we use the average of shipping-point prices of the preceding and following weeks 
when the shipping-point prices were available. If a market was not supplied by California 
for more than two weeks, we use shipping-point prices in a market located closest or the 
average  of  shipping-point  prices  in  several  markets  located  close.  In  either  case,  the 
proxy shipping-point price is the shadow price of California Hass avocados that retailers 
in the market utilized to make their procurement decisions.  
The  model  includes  all  explanatory  variables  in  the  retail  pricing  model  with 
exclusion  of  shipping-point  prices.  Furthermore,  we  include  shipment  volumes  as  an 
explanatory variable, which are shipments in 1,000,000 units for size s avocados shipped 
from  California  to  market  m  in  week  t.  The  variable  is  included  to  indicate  whether 
retailers are able to bid down shipping-point prices for avocados as a consequence of 
large shipments.
11 The model is assumed to have the same model and error structure as 
the retail pricing model. It is also estimated by the Prais-Winsten method. 
A model for retailers’ decisions on temporary price reductions 
The retail pricing model and the model of the farm-retail price spreads reflect changes in 
the means of retail prices and retail markups for avocados, but they do not capture the 
changes in variability of retail prices. As shown in Section V, temporary price reductions 
are a very important feature of retail pricing for avocados, and account for 27 percent of 
quarterly variations in retail prices for avocados. It is possible that, during promotion 
periods, retailers conducted sales more frequently, but sold avocados at higher prices in 
the weeks without sales. In such a case, although the means of retail prices and markups 
might not be significantly lower during promotion periods than during non-promotion 
                                                 
11 This hypothesis was proposed and tested for iceberg lettuce by Sexton and Zhang (1996) and subjected to 
further testing by SZC (2003) for iceberg lettuce and fresh tomatoes.   33 
periods, but the probability of conducting sales were higher during promotion periods 
than during non-promotion periods. Consequently, avocado sales might increase due to 
frequent  price  discounts.  Therefore,  we  employ  a  discrete-choice  model  to  estimate 
retailers’ decisions on temporary price reductions. 
We define that a temporary price reduction occurs if the retail price for size s 
avocados at account a in week t is 20 percent off the quarterly modal price for size s 
avocados at account a. The dependent variable is set to one if retail account a conducted 
a temporary price reduction for size s avocados in week t; otherwise, it is set to zero. 
Retailers’  decisions  on  temporary  price  reductions  are  related  to  the  same  set  of 
explanatory variables in the retail pricing model. The model is in a logit framework. The 
error  term  is  assumed  to  follow  an  extreme  value  distribution  with  zero  mean  and 
heteroskedastic variances at the account-size level. Furthermore, we apply clustering at 
the market level, which allows errors to be correlated for any account-size combinations 
within the same market area. 
A retail sales response model 
A  retail  sales  response  model  is  estimated  to  examine  seasonal  demand  cycles  for 
avocados and the effectiveness of the CAC’s advertising programs in terms of promoting 
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where qa,s,t is the sales volume for size s avocados at retail account a in week t in 1000 
units.  t s a p , , ˆ  and  1 , , ˆ − t s a p  are the predicted retail prices for size s at account a in week t and 
t-1 obtained from the estimation of the retail pricing model (equation (3)). Due to the 
likely  endogeneity  between  the  retail  prices  and  the  error  term  in  the  sales  response 
model, we include the predicted retail prices instead of the actual retail prices. The time-
related  control  variables,  fixed  effects,  and  the  variables  for  the  CAC’s  promotion 
programs have the same interpretations as those included in the retail pricing model. The 
error term, ea,s,t, is assumed to have the same structure as the error term in the retail 
pricing model. The model is estimated by a two-stage least squares procedure. At the first 
stage,  the  retail  pricing  model  is  estimated  by  the  Prais-Winsten  method,  and  the 
predicted retail prices are obtained. At the second stage, the retail sales response model is 
estimated  by  the  Prais-Winsten  procedure  by  incorporating  the  predicted  retail  prices 
from the first stage. 
Hypothesis Tests 
We are interested in testing theories about how retailers set prices in response to changes 
in cost and demand factors. Avocados are, in general, sold directly from grower-shippers 
to  retailers.  Hence,  we  expect  under  competitive  pricing  that  the  coefficients  of  the 
contemporaneous and lagged shipping-point prices should add up to one, as costs pass 
through from farm to retail. Secondly, negative and significant effects of shipping-point 
prices on retailers’ decisions on temporary price reductions indicate that temporary price 
reductions can be explained by decreases in costs.  
Because the imported Hass avocadoes from Chile and Mexico are cheaper than 
the California Hass avocadoes (see footnote 11), we expect that retail prices (retailers’ 
decisions on temporary price reductions) are negatively (positively) correlated with the   35 
availability of MHA and import volumes of MHA and CHA imports. Furthermore, the 
farm-retail price spreads are computed by using shipping-point prices of California Hass 
avocados.  Therefore,  we  expect  that  the  retail  markups  decrease  as  MHA  and  CHA 
imports increase. 
Failure of these cost changes to transmit quickly and fully to the retail prices 
indicates  that  retailers  are  pursuing  a  pricing  strategy  other  than  cost-based,  mark-up 
pricing. Retailer market power in selling to consumers is a necessary condition for the 
pricing schemes described in Section V to develop and sustain. Varian (1980), Lal and 
Matutes (1994), and Hosken and Reiffen (2001, 2004b) explain non-responsive retail 
prices with respect to changes in costs as a consequence of retailers’ sales strategies, 
which reflect changes in retail margins rather than changes in costs. That is, retailers cut 
retail prices or markups despite the changes in costs.  
However, if we find that retail prices are weakly related to shipping-point prices, 
it  may  be  partially  explained  by  retailer  oligopsony  power  in  buying  from  grower-
shippers, which is suggested by Rogers and Sexton (1994), Sexton and Zhang (1996), 
Calvin, Cook, et al. (2001), and SZC (2003). If retailers do not have market power in 
buying from grower-shippers, we expect that shipment volumes have no effect on the 
farm-retail price spreads. Sexton and Zhang (1996) and SZC (2003) suggest that retailers 
are able to bid down prices for perishable commodities and increase the farm-retail price 
spread  during  the  periods  of  abundant  supplies.  Therefore,  a  positive  relationship 
between  the  farm-retail  price  spreads  and  shipment  volumes  indicates  that  the 
determination of retail prices and margins is partially attributed to retailer oligopsony 
power.   36 
Marketing research conducted by the CAC suggests that avocado demand peaks 
during holidays and national events, such as New Year’s Day and Super Bowl Sunday. 
As well, avocado demand is expected to be higher during summer months due to a higher 
incidence of parties, barbeques, etc. According to Warner and Barsky (1995), retail prices 
or margins are lower when the aggregate demand is higher, such as during Thanksgiving 
and  Christmas  holidays;  but  retail  prices  or  margins  do  not  decrease  when  the 
idiosyncratic demand for avocados is higher, such as during Super Bowl Sunday and 
summer months. On the other hand, Lal and Matutes (1994) predict that retail prices or 
markups  are  lower,  and  the  probability  of  sales  is  higher,  during  demand  peaks  for 
avocados. 
Consider now the expected effects of the CAC’s promotions on retail sales, retail 
prices and markups. If the promotions are successful, retail sales should rise, whereas 
unsuccessful promotions will have little impact on sales. A priori expectations for the 
impact of promotions on retail prices are less clear. Unsuccessful promotions should have 
little impact on retailer pricing behavior.  Lal and Matutes’ model (1994) implies that 
retail prices or markups should fall during the CAC’s promotion periods, given that the 
promotions are successful in increasing demand. In contrast, Warner and Barsky’s model 
(1995) does not predict that retailers reduce retail prices or margins as a result of the 
increase in avocado demand generated by the CAC’s promotions. On the other hand, 
evidence  of  higher  retail  markups  in  response  to  CAC  promotions  supports  a  simple 
market power model of retail pricing, whereby retailers increase prices and margins to 
capture benefits from the demand expansion. Notably the behavior described in Lal and 
Matutes’ model reinforces the effect of the CAC promotions, while behavior described 
by the simple market power model mitigates their effectiveness.    37 
In  reality,  retailers  usually  arrange  advertised  sales  before  the  acknowledged 
demand shocks. As commonly observed, store flyers that contain advertised sales are 
usually circulated a week before sales actually take place. For example, retailers learn 
from experience or perceive a higher consumption of avocados during certain periods or 
holidays.  Retailers,  according  to  Lal  and  Matutes  (1994),  will  lower  retail  prices  or 
markups correspondingly. Two implicit conditions are that (i) retailers are well informed 
about the demand shock, and (ii) retailers perceive the demand shock is positive. A lack 
of response in retail pricing to the demand shocks generated by the CAC’s promotions 
does not necessarily imply that retailers behave competitively. It might be caused by lack 
of  communication  between  the  industry  and  retailers  about  the  industry’s  advertising 
campaigns and the effectiveness of the advertising programs.  
We can also test whether the effects of the CAC’s promotion programs on retail 
prices and sales are different across markets by estimating the models separately to obtain 
the pooled promotion parameters across all of the CAC treated markets and the market-
specific promotion parameters in each of the treated markets. Differences among cities in 
the sales response to promotions may reflect different levels of intensity of promotion by 
the CAC, or it may reflect markets that, for whatever reason, are more or less susceptible 
to  avocado  promotions.  Such  information  can  be  valuable  to  CAC  in  tailoring  its 
programs. 
VIII.  The Results 
Estimation results for the models of retailer pricing behavior and the retail sales response 
model are reported in table 5—10. All the models are estimated by using two control 
groups. One control group only includes markets without MHA imports, and the other   38 
includes markets with and without MHA imports. We obtained similar estimation results 
for all models by using either control group. In this section, we only report the results for 
estimations using the larger control group. 
The base models, which pool retail accounts, large and small avocados, and all 
time periods, contain 19,072 observations. That is 124 account-size combinations with 
140-157 weeks for each account-size combination. The  account-size  fixed effects are 
omitted for parsimony of presentation. The base models explain about 2/3 of the variation 
observed in retail prices (R
2 = 0.69), about 2/5 of the variation observed in the farm-retail 
price spreads (R
2 = 0.42), and nearly 3/4 of the variation observed in retail sales (R
2 = 
0.72).  The  Pseudo-R
2  for  the  model  of  temporary  price  reductions  is  0.1.
12 In  the 
following, we present the estimation results by groups of explanatory variables rather 
than by models. 
Shipping-point prices and shipment volumes 
Hass avocados were sold for $1.2 per unit on average at grocery stores. The estimated 
average farm-retail spread ($0.78 per unit) accounted for 65 percent of the estimated 
average retail price. The estimates are consistent with the sample means of the retail price 
and farm-retail price spread, which are $1.3 and $0.73 per unit, respectively. 
The  retail  price  was  positively  correlated  with  the  contemporaneous  shipping-
point price and its one-period lag (panel (a) in table 5). Each coefficient is statistically 
significant in the basic model.  However, the sum of the two coefficients is only 0.34, 
indicating that only about one third of a unit change in the shipping-point price transmits 
to retail within the two-week period. Carman and Sexton (2005) suggest that a 50 percent 
rate of price transmission is consistent with some simple models of monopoly pricing. 
                                                 
12 Pseudo-R
2 is not directly comparable with the standard R
2 (Train, 2003).    39 
The probability of temporary price reductions went up as the shipping-point price 
increased  (panel  (b)  in  table  5).  The  estimated  coefficient  of  the  contemporaneous 
shipping-point price is not statistically significant. Although the estimated coefficient of 
the lagged shipping-point price (0.18) is statistically significant, it is small in magnitude 
compared  with  other  estimated  coefficients.  The  estimates  suggest  that  retailers’ 
decisions  on  temporary  price  reductions  are  not  based  primarily  on  changes  in  the 
shipping-point  price,  i.e.,  not  cost  driven.  Therefore,  the  presence  of  temporary  price 
reductions is attributable to retailers’ sales strategies, which reflect changes in margins 
rather than changes in costs. This finding is consistent with the predictions by Varian 
(1980), Lal and Matutues (1994), and Hosken and Reiffen (2001, 2004b). 
Existence of retailer selling power is necessary for the observed retailer pricing 
behavior for avocados presented in both Section V and this section. However, the non-
responsive retail pricing with respect to changes in costs may be partially due to retailer 
market  power  in  buying  from  avocado  grower-shippers.  The  estimated  coefficient  of 
shipment volumes in the model of the farm-retail price spreads indicates that the retail 
markup increased significantly by 4 cents per unit if the weekly shipment increased by 
one million units (panel (c) in table 5). The result supports the prediction by Sexton and 
Zhang (1996). That is, retailers were able to bid down the procurement price for avocados, 
and obtain a larger retail markup, when there was a large supply of avocados. 
MHA and CHA imports 
The estimated results regarding the effects of MHA and CHA imports are reported in 
table 6. The indicator variable season is intended to capture general shocks during the 
period  when  MHA  imports  are  allowed.  The  variable  has  negative  and  significant 
coefficients in the models for retail prices and the farm-retail price spreads, and a positive   40 
but not significant coefficient in the model for temporary price reductions, indicating that 
retail prices and the farm-retail price spreads were generally lower during the months 
when MHA imports were permitted.
13 
MHA and CHA imports are measured in millions of lbs. The variables for MHA 
imports are zeros in all markets for the months when MHA were not allowed, and in all 
periods  for  the  markets  where  MHA  imports  were  not  allowed  at  any  time.  The 
contemporaneous and lagged values for the volume of MHA imports thus represent the 
“treatment  on  the  treated”.  The  current  value  of  MHA  imports  is  associated  with  a 
positive  and  significant  effect  on  price,  but  the  lagged  value  has  a  negative  and 
significant effect that dominates the positive contemporaneous effect, and is in addition 
to the effect captured by season. At the same time, both the current and lagged MHA 
imports have positive effects on the probability of holding temporary price reductions, 
although only the effect of the lagged value is significant and higher in magnitude. The 
results  indicate  that  retailers  in  the  markets  that  had  assess  to  MHA  imports  had 
significantly lower retail prices, lower retail markups, and were more likely to hold price 
discounts for avocados than retailers in the markets that did not allow MHA imports 
during the import season. 
CHA imports were available to all states in the U.S. Both current and lagged 
values of CHA imports have negative impacts on retail prices and price spreads, and have 
positive  effects  on  temporary  price  reductions.  The  volumes  of  MHA  and  CHA  are 
generally associated with lower retail prices, lower retail markups, and higher probability 
                                                 
13 Notably,  this  effect  may  well  be  due  to  the  presence  of  the  MHA  imports  simply  through  normal 
functioning of the market mechanism.  In response to imports of MHA in some markets, shippers would be 
expected to rationally reallocate some California Hass avocados to the markets not affected directly by 
Mexican imports, which, in turn, could cause retail prices to fall in those markets.   41 
of temporary price reductions. Thus, we can conclude that consumers do benefit as a 
consequence of increasing the volume of imported avocados from Chile and Mexico. 
Seasonal demand shocks 
Turn  now  to  the  estimation  results  for  the  retail  sales  response  model,  which  are 
presented in panel (d) in table 5. An average retail account sold about 65,084 units of 
Hass avocados for each size in one week. We find that the estimated own price elasticity 
of  Hass  avocados  evaluated  at  the  sample  means  is  -2.38  and  is  highly  significant, 
suggesting that demand for Hass avocados at the individual retailer level is quite elastic. 
The  estimated  elasticity  of  the  lagged  own  price  on  demand  is  -0.26  and  is  not 
statistically significant, suggesting the absence of a consumer inventory effect whereby 
low prices in the prior week might cause some consumers to stock avocados, thereby 
decreasing  demand  in  the  next  week.  Such  stockholding  behavior  is  unlikely  due  to 
perishability of avocados. On the other hand, it implies that consumers primarily respond 
to the price tag that they see in the current week, and probably do not remember and/or 
rely on price information in the last week. 
The estimates of time-related and seasonal variables are reported in table 7. The 
models reveal evidence of rising retail prices and sales for avocados, with prices and 
sales slightly higher in marketing year 2003 and significantly higher in marketing year 
2004 than in the base 2002 marketing year. 
As expected, monthly demand for avocados was highest in the summer months 
May through September, with June having the highest demand. A Chi-square test rejects 
the hypothesis of equality in the month-to-month effects (
2
10 χ = 28.7, ρ < 0.01). A mild 
month-to-month pattern in prices is also present, and a Chi-square test for equality of the   42 
monthly price effects is strongly rejected (
2
10 χ = 160.47, ρ < 0.01). Although retail prices 
in the high-demand summer months were not significantly different from other months, 
the  farm-retail  price  spreads  were  significantly  lower  in  May  and  June,  and  the 
probability of temporary price reductions was significantly higher in May, July, August 
and September. 
We also see clear evidence of price effects for some events and holidays. Six 
holidays/events, Christmas/New Year, Super Bowl Sunday, Cinco de Mayo, Memorial 
Day,  Independence  Day,  and  Labor  Day  had  significantly  higher  demands  in  the 
shopping  week(s)  preceding  and/or  during  the  holiday/event.
14  Among  the  six 
holidays/events associated with significantly higher avocado sales, Christmas/New Year, 
Super Bowl Sunday, and Cinco de Mayo are associated with significantly lower prices, 
lower retail margins, and higher incidence of temporary price reductions. Super Bowl 
Sunday  had  the  strongest  effect  on  sales  and  retail  pricing  among  holidays/events. 
Although prices were significantly higher in the weeks associated with Memorial Day, 
retail markups were not significantly higher, and temporary price reductions were more 
likely  to  take  place,  but  not  significantly.  Independence  Day  and  Labor  Day  had  no 
significant effects on retail pricing.  
Thanksgiving  Day  and  Christmas/New  Year  are  considered  national  holidays 
when people go out for shopping. Therefore, we expect that the aggregate demand during 
these holidays is high, as shown in Warner and Barskey (1995) and CKR (2003). We find 
that retail prices and markups were significantly lower only during Christmas/New Year. 
However,  Thanksgiving  Day  had  significantly  positive  effects  on  retail  prices  and 
                                                 
14 The holiday dummy variables are constructed in the following way. If a holiday occurred on Monday, or 
Tuesday, or Wednesday, both the week before and the current week are considered as holiday weeks. If a 
holiday occurred after Wednesday, only the current week is considered as a holiday week.    43 
markups. Therefore, the results are not consistent with the predication by Warner and 
Barsky (1995) that retail prices or markups fall during the periods with high aggregate 
consumer demand, but not during the periods with high idiosyncratic demand. 
The estimation results produce some evidence in support of the hypothesis by Lal 
and Matutes (1994) that retail prices or retail markups are lower, and the probability of 
sales is higher, ceteris paribus, during high-demand periods for avocados. First, retailers 
were more likely to conduct temporary price reductions during almost all the summer 
months  when  demand  for  avocados  was  high.  The  retail  price  for  avocados  was 
significantly lower in May, and the retail margin was significantly lower in May and June 
relative to the January base. Second, the retail price and markup were significantly lower, 
and  the  probability  of  temporary  price  reductions  was  significantly  higher  during 
holidays  and  events  associated  with  significantly  higher  demand  for  avocados,  in 
particular  Super  Bowl  Sunday  and  Cinco  de  Mayo,  when  the  aggregated  consumer 
demand was not necessarily higher. 
The CAC’s promotion programs 
Table 8 presents the estimation results for the effects of the CAC’s promotion programs. 
The CAC’s radio and outdoor advertising campaigns were associated with significantly 
higher retail demands in the base model. The presence of the radio (outdoor) campaign in 
the treated market was associated on average with 7,058 (8,822) more units sold for each 
size of Hass avocados at a retail account in one week. Magazine advertising in Atlanta 
had a positive but mild and insignificant coefficient. Neither the radio, nor outdoor, nor 
magazine  campaigns  had  a  significant  impact  on  retail  price,  or  on  retail  markup  on 
average.  The  retail  price  and  markup  were  lower  (higher)  during  the  radio  (outdoor) 
campaigns, but the effect was negligible and insignificant. However, retailers were more   44 
likely  to  hold  temporary  price  reductions  during  the  CAC’s  promotion  programs,  in 
particular,  retailers  tended  to  conduct  significantly  more  temporary  price  reductions 
during  the  radio  promotions.  Lower  retail  price  and  markup,  and  more  frequent 
temporary  price  reductions  during  the  radio  promotions  may  suggest  that  retailers 
responded more actively to the radio advertising than to the outdoor promotions. 
Market-specific promotion coefficients are also estimated for the CAC’s radio and 
outdoor  campaigns.  The  estimation  results  are  reported  in  table  9.
15 Nine  of  the  ten 
selected markets were associated with higher retail sales during the radio promotions, and 
three of them (San Francisco, Los Angeles and Dallas) had significantly higher sales. A 
test for the equality of the sales responses to the radio campaigns across all the treated 
markets is rejected at the 95 percent level (
2
9 χ =17.08, ρ = 0.048). None of the three 
markets with significantly higher sales during the radio promotions were associated with 
significantly lower retail prices or markups. Retail prices were lower in five out of ten 
treated markets, but only significantly lower in Atlanta, during the radio promotions. A 
test that the price responses to the radio promotions are jointly equal to zero in all treated 
markets is rejected at the 95 percent level (
2
10 χ =19.95, ρ = 0.032). Radio promotions had 
no significant effects on retail markups in any of the treated markets. A test that the 
responses of retail margins to the radio campaigns are jointly equal to zeros in all treated 
markets cannot be rejected (
2
9 χ =13.04, ρ = 0.221). 
The estimates of the market-specific responses to the CAC’s outdoor campaigns 
revealed a higher degree of heterogeneity than those to the radio campaigns. All of the 
                                                 
15 Table  9  only  reports  coefficients  related  to  the  market-specific  effects.    Coefficients  for  the  other 
variables were little changed when the estimation model was expanded to include market-specific effects 
for the promotion variables.   45 
three tests for equality of the responses in sales, retail prices, and retail markups to the 
outdoor promotions across the treated markets are rejected. Eight out of nine markets had 
higher  retail  sales  during  the  outdoor  promotions,  with  four  of  the  effects  being 
statistically significant. The CAC’s outdoor campaigns had the strongest sales effects in 
San Antonio, where retail prices and markups were also significantly lower during the 
outdoor campaigns. Notice that the radio campaigns also had the largest positive effects 
on sales, and negative effects on retail prices and retail markups in San Antonio, although 
none  of  them  are  statistically  significant.  Combined,  the  CAC’s  radio  and  outdoor 
campaigns had comparatively large effects on retail sales in San Antonio, San Francisco, 
and Los Angeles, and comparatively minor effects on retail sales in Portland and Atlanta. 
 Both radio and outdoor advertising programs were successful in promoting sales 
at the retail level in the selected markets. In general, both campaigns had little effect on 
retail prices and retail margins. On balance the evidence is mixed relative to the Lal and 
Matutes hypothesis that higher retail demands are associated with lower retail prices or 
retail  margins,  and  there  is  no  support  for  the market-power  hypothesis  that  retailers 
would  capture  benefits  of  demand-expanding  industry  promotions  through  charging 
higher prices. 
As noted, retailers usually make ex-ante pricing decision. Retailers, according to 
Lal and Matutes, reduce retail prices or retail markups only if they are well informed 
about the advertising campaigns, and/or they believe that the CAC’s radio and outdoor 
promotions will effectively increase avocado demand. Therefore, the CAC’s promotion 
programs could possibly be enhanced if the CAC improves communication with retailers 
about its advertising campaigns.    46 
IX. Conclusions 
Retailers are becoming the dominant players in the food chain in the U.S. and elsewhere 
(Calvin and Cook, et al., 2001). Retailer market power is a topical issue in light of the 
long-standing conceptual bases, a growing body of empirical evidence, the consolidation 
within  the  retail  sector,  and  the  adoption  of  contracting  and  other  emerging  trade 
practices between retailers and the upstream suppliers. 
Using a unique micro dataset, we have examined retailer pricing behavior for 
avocados to uncover its important characteristics and to examine the relationship between 
retail  pricing  and  the  underlying  demand  and  cost  factors.  The  study  also  provides 
evidence  regarding  the  effectiveness  of  the  CAC’s  promotion  policies,  in  view  of 
retailers’ pricing behavior for avocados. Although the analysis focuses on avocados, the 
results shed some light on understanding retailer market power and retail pricing issues, 
and the findings apply broadly to other grocery products, in particular those in the fresh 
produce category.  
Our  analysis  shows  that  retail  prices  for  avocados  are  highly  dispersed  both 
spatially  and  temporarily.  Retailer  pricing  behavior  for  avocados  revealed  substantial 
heterogeneity and an absence of coordination among retailers within the same market 
area. Retail price for avocados remained at a “regular” (modal) level for 21 percent of the 
time quarterly and 13 percent of the time annually. Decreases in retail price from the 
regular price dominated retail price variations. In particular, temporary price reductions 
explained 27 percent of quarterly changes in retail prices. These important features of 
retailer pricing behavior for avocados are consistent with those for other grocery products 
that  have  been  documented  in  empirical  studies,  such  as  Pensendorfer  (2002),  CKR 
(2003), SZC (2003), Hosken and Reiffen (2001, 2004a, 2004b), and Li and Sexton (2005).   47 
Our findings offer some evidence to support Varian’s (1980) predictions about retailer 
pricing behavior.  
Shipping-point prices accounted for only 35 percent of retail prices for avocados 
on average. Retail prices for avocados are weakly correlated with shipping-point prices 
for avocados. In addition, less than half of a change in shipping-point price transmitted on 
average to retail over the two-week horizon that coincides roughly with the shelf life of a 
fresh avocado. Further, we show that retailers’ sales strategies, reflecting decreases in 
retail  margins  other  than  decreases  in  costs,  explained  the  observed  temporary  price 
reductions  for  avocados.  These  results  are  consistent  with  Varian  (1980),  Lal  and 
Matutues (1994), and Hosken and Reiffen (2001, 2004b), who offer explanations for the 
lack of responses in retail prices to cost changes, and predict that retailers have incentive 
to reduce retail prices or conduct  sales even when there is no change in costs.  
Retail prices were significantly lower as a function of the amount of avocados 
imported from Chile and Mexico, meaning that consumers have benefited from trade 
liberalization for avocados. Also notable is the rather strong evidence that retail margins 
increased  significantly  as  shipment  volumes  increased,  indicating  retailer  oligopsony 
power expressed in terms of retailer being able to bid down the procurement price for 
avocados during periods of abundant supply. On balance, we conclude that costs are not a 
primary factor in determining retail prices for avocados. 
Retail  prices  for  avocados  presented  countercyclical  movements  over  seasonal 
demand shocks. Retail prices and markups were significantly lower, and the probability 
of temporary price reductions was significantly higher, during some holidays, events and 
summer  months  associated  with  significantly  higher  demand  for  avocados,  especially 
during Super Bowl Sunday and Cinco de Mayo. The evidence provides support for the   48 
prediction by Lal and Matutes (1994) that retailers reduce retail prices or margins during 
a commodity’s high-demand periods. 
The  difference-in-difference  framework  enables  us  to  isolate  the  impacts  of 
California  Avocado  Commission  (CAC)  promotion  programs  on  retail  avocado  sales 
from other exogenous forces affecting sales. The analysis demonstrates that the CAC’s 
radio campaign and outdoor advertisements were successful in raising avocado sales in 
the markets where the CAC conducted its promotions.  
We find little impact of the CAC’s promotional campaigns on retailer pricing, 
however. The estimated impacts of both radio and outdoor campaigns were on average 
very small and not statistically significant. There is no evidence to support the hypothesis 
that retailers capture some or all of the demand expansion induced by CAC promotions 
through charging higher prices. The evidence is mixed relative to the Lal and Matutes 
hypothesis that higher demand for avocados is associated with lower retail prices or retail 
margins. However, lack of response in retail pricing to the CAC’s promotions may imply 
that the promotional effects could be enhanced if retailers acknowledged the adverting 
campaigns, and were convinced that the promotions would successfully increase demand 
for avocados. 
The  impacts  of  the  outdoor  promotions  on  both  price  and  sales  differed 
significantly across the ten retail markets where the CAC focused its efforts, whereas the 
effects of the radio promotions were similar across the treated markets. There is also mild 
evidence  that  retailers  responded  to  the  radio  promotions  more  actively  than  to  the 
outdoor promotions by lowering retail prices and markups, and conducting sales.   49 
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Figure 2 Histograms with Kernel Density Estimation for  
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 Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Retail Prices and Shipping-Point Prices for Hass Avocados ($/unit) 
      Price ranges      Price ranges 
  Mean  Std.  25-75 pct.  min-max  Mean  Std.  25-75 pct.  Min-max 
  Panel (a) Retail Prices and Shipping-Point Prices for All Markets and Sizes 
  Retail Prices  Shipping-Point Prices 
Average (all sizes and markets)  1.30  0.43  0.55  2.55  0.57  0.19  0.27  1.35 
  Panel (b) Retail Prices 
Account  Large Size  Small Size 
Baltimore 1  1.32  0.35  0.48  1.34  1.31  0.36  0.50  1.38 
Baltimore 2  1.56  0.32  0.49  1.87  1.36  0.15  0.20  0.50 
Baltimore 3  1.65  0.25  0.09  1.25  -  -  -  - 
                 
Chicago 1  1.64  0.27  0.40  1.13  1.24  0.39  0.88  1.24 
Chicago 2  1.52  0.25  0.28  1.09  1.16  0.28  0.38  1.38 
                 
Dallas 1  1.93  0.38  0.22  1.90  1.05  0.19  0.26  0.85 
Dallas 2  1.07  0.44  0.77  1.68  0.92  0.17  0.20  0.94 
Dallas 3  1.44  0.25  0.22  1.43  1.09  0.55  0.91  1.75 
Dallas 4  1.03  0.35  0.31  1.84  0.77  0.21  0.30  1.14 
Dallas 5  1.58  0.29  0.52  1.13  1.22  0.51  1.01  1.63 
                 
Denver 1  1.95  0.29  0.18  1.48  1.11  0.26  0.28  1.39 
Denver 2  1.35  0.31  0.46  1.62  1.20  0.33  0.51  1.60 
Denver 3  1.61  0.40  0.64  2.36  1.48  0.39  0.18  1.86 
                 
Los Angeles 1  1.70  0.48  0.58  2.48  1.14  0.34  0.44  2.02 
Los Angeles 2  1.33  0.33  0.28  1.64  0.50  0.16  0.19  0.88 
Los Angeles 3  1.87  0.22  0.18  1.30  0.68  0.22  0.42  1.18 
Los Angeles 4  1.33  0.27  0.43  1.25  -  -  -  - 
Los Angeles 5  1.66  0.36  0.61  1.51  1.16  0.28  0.50  1.12 
                 
Phoenix 1  1.67  0.32  0.49  1.40  0.99  0.20  0.20  1.08 
Phoenix 2  1.35  0.59  0.69  2.18  0.68  0.26  0.28  1.75 
Phoenix 3  1.34  0.27  0.39  1.33  0.96  0.32  0.52  1.12 
Phoenix 4  1.85  0.50  0.75  2.06  1.07  0.23  0.09  1.33 
                 
Seattle 1  1.96  0.32  0.15  1.92  1.10  0.26  0.31  1.42 
Seattle 2  1.58  0.43  0.82  1.90  1.42  0.39  0.59  1.36 
Seattle 3  1.95  0.25  0.10  2.01  1.93  0.28  0.13  1.47 
Seattle 4  1.84  0.28  0.31  1.44  1.22  0.39  0.42  1.26 
Average (all markets)  1.48  0.36  0.57  2.50  1.11  0.40  0.62  2.28 
  Panel (c) Shipping-Point Prices 
Market  Large Size  Small Size 
Baltimore  0.69  0.15  0.17  0.75  0.42  0.12  0.13  0.70 
Chicago  0.70  0.15  0.14  0.75  0.45  0.12  0.11  0.81 
Dallas  0.71  0.16  0.17  0.81  0.36  0.12  0.08  0.77 
Denver  0.69  0.15  0.16  0.67  0.42  0.09  0.11  0.49 
Los Angeles  0.72  0.15  0.16  0.72  0.37  0.08  0.12  0.50 
Phoenix  0.70  0.14  0.15  0.70  0.33  0.09  0.10  0.58 
Seattle  0.78  0.16  0.21  0.86  0.42  0.08  0.09  0.44 
Average (all markets)  0.71  0.15  0.17  1.16  0.43  0.11  0.14  0.90   55 
Table 2 Summary for Test Results of Equality of Means and Variances of Retail Prices 
 
H0 for Hypothesis Test 1: equality of means of retail prices between retail accounts
1,2 
H0 for Hypothesis Test 2: equality of variances of retail prices within a market
1 
    Large Size  Small Size 








No. of tests 
reject H0 
Reject H0: 




No. of tests 
reject H0 
Reject H0: 
Yes or No 
Atlanta  2  1  0  No  1  0  Yes 
Baltimore  3  3  3  Yes  1  0  Yes 
Boston  3  3  3  Yes  3  2  Yes 
Buffalo
3  2  1  1  Yes       
Charlotte  2  1  1  No  1  1  Yes 
Chicago  2  1  1  Yes  1  0  No 
Dallas  5  10  9  Yes  10  9  Yes 
Denver  3  3  3  Yes  3  2  Yes 
Houston  5  10  7  Yes  10  8  Yes 
Jacksonville  3  3  3  Yes  3  2  Yes 
Los Angeles  5  10  9  Yes  6  5  Yes 
Miami  2  1  0  Yes  1  1  No 
New York  4  6  3  Yes  6  2  Yes 
Philadelphia
3  2  1  0  Yes       
Phoenix  4  10  9  Yes  6  5  Yes 
Portland  3  3  3  Yes  1  1  Yes 
Richmond/Norfolk  2  1  1  Yes  1  1  Yes 
Salt Lake City  2  1  0  Yes  1  1  Yes 
San Antonio  2  1  1  No  1  1  Yes 
San Francisco  6  15  12  Yes  15  12  Yes 
Seattle  4  6  5  Yes  6  6  Yes 
South Carolina  3  3  2  Yes  6  5  Yes 
Tampa  3  3  1  Yes  3  3  Yes 
Tennessee  2  1  1  Yes  1  1  Yes 
Total  74  98  78 
21 (Yes) 
3 (No)  87  68 
20 (Yes) 
2 (No) 
Notes:    
1.  Tests are relevant to markets that have more than one retail accounts in the data.  
2.  Tests are pairwise comparisons of retail prices between retailers in the same market area. The 
number of tests for a given market is n(n-1)/2, where n is the number of retailers in the market. 
3.  In Buffalo and Philadelphia, only one retailer in the data sold small size avocados during the study 
period. 
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Table 3  Price Correlations in Selected Markets 
(a) Baltimore 
  Baltimore-1-la  Baltimore-1-sm  Baltimore-2-la  Baltimore-2-sm  Baltimore-3-la 
Baltimore-1-la  1.00         
Baltimore-1-sm  1.00  1.00       
Baltimore-2-la  0.65  0.65  1.00     
Baltimore-2-sm  0.28  0.25  0.11  1.00   
Baltimore-3-la  0.23  0.22  0.39  0.25  1.00 
fob-la  0.26  0.26  0.06  0.56  0.22 
fob-la (-1)  0.28  0.28  0.07  0.63  0.31 
fob-sm  0.07  0.07  0.17  0.43  0.39 
fob-sm (-1)  0.11  0.11  0.19  0.51  0.44 
 
(b) Chicago 
  Chicago-1-la  Chicago-1-sm  Chicago-2-la  Chicago-2-sm 
Chicago-1-la  1.00       
Chicago-1-sm  0.52  1.00     
Chicago-2-la  0.43  0.17  1.00   
Chicago-2-sm  0.02  -0.24  0.34  1.00 
fob-la  0.15  0.46  0.32  -0.04 
fob-la (-1)  0.15  0.48  0.35  -0.01 
fob-sm  0.13  0.40  0.29  -0.04 
fob-sm (-1)  0.14  0.40  0.33  0.00 
 






















Dallas-1-la  1.00                   
Dallas-1-sm  0.43  1.00                 
Dallas-2-la  0.11  0.03  1.00               
Dallas-2-sm  0.35  0.30  0.50  1.00             
Dallas-3-la  0.40  0.11  0.19  0.20  1.00           
Dallas-3-sm  0.40  -0.06  0.62  0.28  0.40  1.00         
Dallas-4-la  -0.35  0.18  -0.09  -0.02  -0.20  -0.14  1.00       
Dallas-4-sm  0.37  0.17  0.33  0.46  0.26  0.31  -0.11  1.00     
Dallas-5-la  -0.02  0.19  0.22  -0.13  -0.02  0.11  0.23  0.14  1.00   
Dallas-5-sm  -0.46  0.35  0.37  0.34  -0.24  -0.10  0.19  0.03  -0.06  1.00 
fob-la  0.41  0.51  -0.06  0.34  0.12  0.03  0.10  0.28  -0.08  0.35 
fob-la (-1)  0.40  0.51  -0.01  0.38  0.13  0.05  0.09  0.24  -0.09  0.38 
fob-sm  0.41  0.55  0.04  0.43  0.17  0.05  0.00  0.38  -0.08  0.44 
fob-sm (-1)  0.39  0.56  0.04  0.45  0.20  0.08  -0.02  0.35  -0.11  0.46 
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(d) Denver 
  Denver-1-la  Denver-1-sm  Denver-2-la  Denver-2-sm  Denver-3-la  Denver-3-sm 
Denver-1-la  1.00           
Denver-1-sm  0.18  1.00         
Denver-2-la  -0.06  0.23  1.00       
Denver-2-sm  -0.11  -0.08  0.59  1.00     
Denver-3-la  0.46  0.32  0.32  0.14  1.00   
Denver-3-sm  0.65  0.48  -0.03  -0.17  0.46  1.00 
fob-la  0.29  0.57  0.40  0.08  0.38  0.49 
fob-la (-1)  0.33  0.58  0.42  0.08  0.38  0.52 
fob-sm  0.28  0.63  0.35  0.10  0.49  0.55 
fob-sm (-1)  0.30  0.66  0.42  0.09  0.50  0.56 
 
(e) Los Angeles 
  LA-1-la  LA-1-sm  LA-2-la  LA-2-sm  LA-3-la  LA-3-sm  LA-4-la  LA-5-la  LA-5-sm 
LA-1-la  1.00                 
LA-1-sm  0.53  1.00               
LA-2-la  0.31  0.16  1.00             
LA-2-sm  0.09  0.11  0.19  1.00           
LA-3-la  0.12  0.32  0.16  0.01  1.00         
LA-3-sm  -0.09  0.30  0.04  0.35  0.33  1.00       
LA-4-la  -0.20  0.32  0.43  0.09  0.17  -0.05  1.00     
LA-5-la  0.51  0.55  0.31  0.24  0.22  0.38  0.34  1.00   
LA-5-sm  0.31  -0.15  0.23  0.02  0.08  -0.26  0.25  0.04  1.00 
fob-la  0.13  0.27  0.13  0.34  0.14  0.13  0.36  0.35  0.32 
fob-la (-1)  0.16  0.29  0.15  0.33  0.17  0.15  0.34  0.35  0.31 
fob-sm  0.28  0.35  0.26  0.45  0.10  0.16  0.40  0.43  0.35 




















Phoenix-1-la  1.00               
Phoenix-1-sm  0.43  1.00             
Phoenix-2-la  -0.44  -0.09  1.00           
Phoenix-2-sm  0.63  0.29  -0.45  1.00         
Phoenix-3-la  0.01  0.07  -0.68  0.14  1.00       
Phoenix-3-sm  0.62  0.26  -0.69  0.70  0.27  1.00     
Phoenix-4-la  0.46  0.26  -0.70  0.59  0.24  0.66  1.00   
Phoenix-4-sm  0.47  0.37  -0.34  0.63  0.03  0.70  0.46  1.00 
fob-la  0.54  0.44  -0.01  0.36  0.07  0.52  0.31  0.51 
fob-la (-1)  0.58  0.45  -0.05  0.38  0.04  0.54  0.34  0.51 
fob-sm  0.58  0.49  -0.08  0.50  -0.05  0.53  0.33  0.55 
fob-sm (-1)  0.60  0.49  -0.10  0.51  -0.07  0.55  0.33  0.57 
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Table 4 Variations in Retail Prices for Hass Avocados 
 
  Retail Price Index 
Size of Hass avocados  # of observations  Mean  Std. 
Large  9342  0.92 (0.94)  0.18 (0.20) 
Small  9730  0.93 (0.97)  0.22 (0.23) 
       
  The average frequencies of retail prices 
  =  mode  >  mode  <  mode 
Large  21.71 (13.98)   15.01 (24.77)  63.28 (61.25) 
Small   20.43 (12.84)   17.29 (31.58)  62.28 (55.58) 
       
  The average frequencies of retail prices >  mode, by 
  10%  20%  30% 
Large  6.02 (13.37)    3.97 (9.21)  2.69 (6.70) 
Small   7.42 (17.71)  5.53 (12.10)  3.62 (7.99) 
       
  The average frequencies of retail prices < mode, by 
  10%  20%  30% 
Large  33.78 (35.73)  21.82 (23.29)  14.19 (12.26) 
Small   33.27 (32.66)  20.92 (21.66)  12.26 (12.44) 
Note: The numbers outside and to the left of the parentheses are calculated according to annual model 
prices, and the numbers in the parentheses are calculated according to quarterly model prices.   59 
Table 5: Estimation Results (I): General Estimation Results 
 
Panel (a): The Retail Pricing Model 
Dependent variable  Retail Price 
Constant  1.206*** 
  (0.110) 
Shipping point price   
Shipping point price (t)  0.136*** 
  (0.027) 
Shipping point price (t-1)  0.205*** 
  (0.027) 
   
R
2  0.69 
 
Panel (b): The Model for Retailers’ Decisions on Temporary Price Reductions 
Dependent variable  Temporary Price Reduction 
Shipping point price   
Shipping point price (t)  0.893 
  (0.291) 
Shipping point price (t-1)  0.180*** 
  (0.059) 
   
pseudo R
2  0.10 
 
Panel (c): The Model of the Farm-Retail Price Spreads 
Dependent variable  The Farm-Retail Price Spread 
Constant  0.786*** 
  (0.091) 
Shipment volume  0.038*** 
  (0.009) 
   
R-squared  0.42 
 
Panel (d) The Retail Sales Response Model 
Dependent variable  Retail Sales 
Constant  65.084*** 
  (13.183) 
Retail price   
Retail price (t)  -58.128*** 
  (14.175) 
Retail price (t-1)  -7.066 
  (9.649) 
   
R-squared  0.72 
 
Notes:    
1.  The reported estimates are estimated coefficients and the stand errors for the retail pricing model, 
the model of the farm-retail price spreads, and the retail sales response model. The reported 
estimates are estimated odds ratios and the standard errors for the model of temporary price 
reductions. Odds ratios represent log odds. For example, a coefficient of 1.5 implies that a one-
unit change in this explanatory variable results in a 1.5-unit change in the log of the odds of 
holding temporary price reductions. 
2.  Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.  
3.  One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 6: Estimation Results (II): Effects of Hass Imports 
 
  Retail Price  Price Spread  Temporary Price Reduction 
Control Variable       
Season  -0.041**  -0.054**  1.044 
  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.166) 
Imports       
Mexican imports (t)  0.002  0.001  0.972 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.024) 
Mexican imports (t-1)  -0.006***  -0.007***  1.060*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.026) 
Chilean imports (t)  -0.002**  -0.002  0.998 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.008) 
Chilean imports (t-1)  -0.003***  -0.003**  1.038*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.007) 
   Notes: The same as those listed in Table 5.  
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Table 7: Estimation Results (III): Effects of Seasonal Demand Shocks 
 
  Retail Sales  Retail Price  Price Spread  Temporary Price Reduction 
         
Import year         
Marketing year=2003  1.403  0.030*  -0.014  1.351*** 
  (1.749)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.142) 
Marketing year=2004  5.244***  0.075***  0.082  1.081 
  (1.904)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.169) 
         
Month         
Feb  0.645  -0.015  0.002  1.590*** 
  (2.262)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.237) 
Mar  -0.143  -0.040  -0.039  2.384*** 
  (2.547)  (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.432) 
Apr  -0.888  -0.019  -0.034  3.492*** 
  (2.921)  (0.029)  (0.034)  (0.836) 
May  4.623  -0.107***  -0.153***  4.594*** 
  (2.985)  (0.032)  (0.037)  (0.340) 
June  12.330***  0.018  -0.075**  1.578 
  (3.745)  (0.033)  (0.038)  (0.466) 
July  8.192**  0.046  -0.019  1.997*** 
  (3.661)  (0.032)  (0.037)  (0.633) 
August  5.266  0.042  -0.019  2.086** 
  (3.251)  (0.030)  (0.034)  (0.539) 
September  6.640**  0.019  -0.048  3.516*** 
  (2.915)  (0.030)  (0.034)  (1.008) 
October  2.417  0.006  -0.093***  1.434 
  (2.810)  (0.029)  (0.033)  (0.343) 
November  2.869  0.014  -0.033  1.355 
  (2.658)  (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.252) 
December  -0.068  0.001  0.010  1.538** 
  (2.184)  (0.020)  (0.023)  (0.237) 
         
Holidays/Events         
Christmas/NY  4.347**  -0.040**  -0.041**  1.765*** 
  (2.010)  (0.016)  (0.019)  (0.232) 
Super Bowl  15.040***  -0.093***  -0.104***  2.843*** 
  (2.735)  (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.522) 
Cinco de Mayo  5.077*  -0.046**  -0.034  2.377*** 
  (2.776)  (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.452) 
Easter Sunday  2.662  0.033**  0.031  1.002 
  (2.031)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.143) 
Memorial Day  6.044**  0.048**  0.017  0.770 
  (2.712)  (0.022)  (0.026)  (0.134) 
Independence Day  7.303***  0.010  -0.006  1.278 
  (2.510)  (0.021)  (0.025)  (0.190) 
Labor Day  3.536*  -0.010  0.002  0.898 
  (1.976)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.106) 
Halloween  1.531  0.012  -0.052**  0.743*** 
  (2.068)  (0.078)  (0.201)  (0.097) 
Thanksgiving  -1.763  0.024***  0.043***  0.697*** 
  (1.606)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.109) 
Notes: The same as those listed in Table 5.  
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Table 8: Estimation Results (IV): Effects of the CAC’s Promotions 
 
  Retail Sales  Retail Price  Price Spread  Temporary Price Reduction 
Control variables         
Radio  -2.211*  -0.011  -0.001  0.787* 
  (1.184)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.102) 
Outdoor  -0.066  -0.034***  -0.023  0.834 
  (1.422)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.105) 
Promotions         
Radio  7.058***  -0.007  -0.005  1.378** 
  (2.857)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.215) 
Outdoor  8.822***  0.010  0.014  1.338 
  (3.376)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.271) 
Magazine  0.430  0.022  0.021  0.896 
  (2.076)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.097) 
Notes: The same as those listed in Table 5. 
 
Table 9: Estimation Results (V): Effects of the CAC’s Promotions (Market-Specific) 
 
    Radio      Outdoor   
  Retail Sales  Retail Price  Price Spread  Retail Sales  Retail Price  Price Spread 
San Francisco  13.362**  -0.033  -0.028  1.320  0.029  0.038 
  (5.522)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (5.841)  (0.026)  (0.026) 
Los Angeles  7.920*  0.015  0.000  4.671  0.032*  0.025 
  (4.870)  (0.017)  (0.023)  (5.333)  (0.019)  (0.022) 
Denver  3.960  0.043  0.054  -4.254  0.072  0.081 
  (4.658)  (0.047)  (0.051)  (5.108)  (0.052)  (0.056) 
Phoenix  2.501  0.034*  0.032  4.739**  0.026  0.028 
  (1.934)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (2.153)  (0.020)  (0.023) 
Huston  5.481  -0.003  -0.003  7.722*  -0.031  -0.036 
  (3.985)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (4.567)  (0.019)  (0.020) 
Dallas  5.521**  0.017  0.026  3.168  -0.008  0.000 
  (2.234)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (2.365)  (0.021)  (0.022) 
San Antonio  29.811  -0.021  -0.021  144.079***  - 0.100***  -0.107*** 
  (36.112)  (0.031)  (0.030)  (39.823)  (0.033)  (0.032) 
Seattle  1.610  0.004  0.002  2.752**  0.030  0.025 
  (1.011)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (1.173)  (0.024)  (0.025) 
Portland  -1.395  -0.001  0.005  2.836  0.065**  0.070** 
  (1.456)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (1.761)  (0.030)  (0.032) 
Atlanta  0.606  -0.053**  -0.415       
  (1.856)  (0.028)  (0.029)       
             
Hypothesis Test 1             
H0: Promotion coefficients are equal across the treated markets.  
(d.f. = 9 for radio promotions; d.f. = 8 for outdoor promotions) 
Chi-squared  17.08  15.28  12.29  26  15.71  26.66 
p-value  (0.048)  (0.084)  (0.198)  (0.001)  (0.047)  (0.001) 
             
Hypothesis Test 2             
H0: Promotion coefficients are equal to zeros in all the treated markets. 
(d.f. = 10 for radio promotions; d.f. = 9 for outdoor promotions) 
Chi-squared  17.38  19.95  13.04  26.03  22.40  26.69 
p-value  (0.067)  (0.032)  (0.221)  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.002) 
Notes: The same as those listed in Table 5. 
 